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Administrative Justice, Environmental 
Governance and the Rule of Law in Malawi 
CHIKOSA BANDA†  
ABSTRACT  
 It is generally believed that administrative law is a 
tool for promoting the rule of law, constitutionalism 
and good governance. This belief stems from the fact 
that governance is about legality, procedural proprie-
ty, rationality and public participation in the exercise 
of power. Commentators have repeatedly contended 
that administrative law contributes to the realization 
of good governance by ensuring that those who make 
decisions comply with the law and ensure that deci-
sions are fair and rational. Administrative law is thus 
believed to be an invaluable tool for preventing arbi-
trary and capricious governance. However, one issue 
remains underexplored. This is whether the principles 
of administrative law are reflected in the daily opera-
tions of public agencies, including environmental 
agencies. There is a dearth of empirical research to 
assess the impact of administrative law generally and 
judicial review on the quality of governance and the 
rule of law.  Similarly, no attempt has been made to 
try to understand the impact of the quickening of judi-
cial review on the work of administrative agencies 
generally and environmental agencies in particular.  
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† Faculty of Law, University of Malawi: Chancellor College. 
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Against this backdrop, this Paper examines the 
impact of administrative law on the rule of law and 
governance in Malawi, using environmental agencies 
as a case study. This Paper draws insights from em-
pirical research recently conducted by the author with 
funding from the International Development Research 
Centre (Canada). Its findings expose a number of limi-
tations of administrative law as a tool for facilitating 
good environmental governance and the rule of law. 
These include regulatory or power capture by “invisi-
ble Barons” who wield their power to undermine the 
effectiveness of administrative law. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
The advent of multiparty democracy in 1993 heralded the dawn 
of the prominence of administrative law and administrative justice on 
the constitutional landscape of Malawi.1  This has been noted in exist-
ing literature which documents the growing importance of adminis-
trative law and judicial review of administrative action in Malawi 
since 1992.2  The literature suggests that, over the past two decades, 
judicial review has become an important tool for testing the compati-
bility of the actions of government agencies with the Constitution.  
This dramatic rise in the scope and intensity of judicial review has 
partly been attributed to the political transition to multiparty democ-
racy which had its genesis around 1992.3  Existing literature has also 
documented the increasing importance of administrative law in envi-
ronmental governance.4 
 
 
 
 
 1.  Matembo S. Nzunda The Quickening of Judicial Control of Administrative Action 
in Malawi, 1992–1994, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN MALAWI: A STOCKTAKING 283, 283 
(Kings M. Phiri & Kenneth R. Ross eds., 1998). 
 2.  Id.; Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Liberating Malawi’s Administrative Justice Juris-
prudence from its Common Law Shackles, 55 J. AFR. L. 105 (2011). 
 3.  See Nzunda, supra note 1; Chirwa, supra note 2. 
 4.  See, e.g., LJ Kotzé, The Application of Just Administrative Action in the South Afri-
can Environmental Governance Sphere: An Analysis of Some Contemporary Thoughts and 
Recent Jurisprudence, 7(2) P.E.R., 58 (2004); Lye Lin Heng, The Judiciary and Environ-
mental Governance in Singapore, 3 J. CT. INNOVATION 133 (2010).  
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        Administrative law according to one commentator “defines the 
structural position of administrative agencies within the government- 
tal system, specifies the decisional procedures those agencies must 
follow and determines the availability and scope of review of their 
actions by the independent judiciary.”5  
Glazewiski, an eminent environmental law scholar, has de-
scribed environmental law as “administrative law in action.”6  He ba-
ses his assertion on the fact that the administration of environmental 
law involves “administrative decision-making and environmental 
conflicts invariably turn on the exercise of administrative decision-
making powers.”7  Administrative decision-making by environmental 
agencies is one of the primary concerns of administrative law.8  The 
development, implementation and enforcement of environmental law 
essentially involves administrative actions as well as decision-making 
within the context of environmental agencies.9  These agencies are 
also given the responsibility of initiating and promulgating environ-
mental regulations.10  Administrative decision-making is thus the 
primary mode of implementing and enforcing environmental law.11  
It is generally believed that the central purpose of administrative 
law is to promote good administration and adherence to the rule of 
law.  As Jayakumar observes, administrative law has two functions, 
namely prevention of governmental excesses and promotion of good 
governance.12  However, one issue that remains underexplored is 
whether the principles of administrative justice are reflected in the 
daily operations of governmental agencies, generally and environ-
mental agencies in particular.  There is a dearth of empirical research 
to assess the validity of the dominant understanding that administra-
tive law catalyzes good governance, especially in the context of envi-
ronmental governance.13  No empirical research has been done to de-
 
 5.  Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 438 (2003). 
 6.  JAN GLAZEWISKI, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 97 (2000). 
 7.  Id.  
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Kotzé, supra note 4, at 59.  
 10.  MIGAI AKECH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 239–77 (2016). 
 11.  M.A. Rabie et al., Implementation of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 120–28 (R.F. Fuggle & M.A. Rabie eds., 2000).  
 12.  Srividhya Jayakumar, Administrative Law in India: The Fire Fighting and the Fire 
Watching Functions, 4 L. QUEST 81, 82 (2011). 
 13.  VARDA BONDY ET AL., THE VALUE AND EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE NATURE 
OF CLAIMS, THEIR OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (2015); Marc Hertogh & Simon Halli-
day, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact in Future Research, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
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termine the impact of administrative law and judicial review on the 
quality of environmental rule-making, application and adjudication in 
Malawi.  Attempts to understand the rise of judicial review have not 
been empirically grounded.  Although there is some literature that at-
tempts to explain the proliferation of judicial review cases in the 
post-1992 era, there has been no attempt to analyze the qualitative 
significance of judicial review in environmental governance.14  Simi-
larly, no attempt has been made to try to understand the impact of the 
quickening of judicial review on environmental governance and the 
rule of law.  
The deficiency of empirical research on the impact of judicial 
review is not surprising given that, globally, the relationship between 
administrative law and governance is assumed.  There is inadequate 
empirical evidence to support the accuracy of dominant understand-
ings around the purpose of administrative law and judicial review.  
Much of what is known about the impact of judicial review on the 
decision-making culture within government is based on anecdotal ev-
idence.15  
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the operations of 
administrative law in the environmental sphere and how its mecha-
nisms influence the ways in which environmental agencies function.  
B. Study Objectives 
This study has the following objectives: 
(a)  To determine how environmental agencies in Ma-
lawi make and apply rules and adjudicate disputes; 
(b) To analyze the qualitative significance of adminis-
trative justice on environmental governance and the 
rule of law; and  
(c) To determine the role and impact of judicial review 
on environmental governance and the rule of law. 
 
BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Marc Her-
togh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004); Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How the Prospect of Judicial Re-
view Shapes Bureaucratic Decision Making, 14 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with the Carolina Digital Repository, 
University of North Carolina).  
 14.  Nzunda, supra note 1, at 283; Chirwa, supra note 2.  
 15. Ross Cranston, Reviewing Judicial Review, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
GOVERNMENT ACTION 45, 72–73 (Genevra Richardson & Hazel Genn eds., 1994). 
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C. Theoretical Framework 
1. Administrative Law and Environmental Governance 
Bradley and Ewing define administrative law as “a branch of 
public law concerned with the composition, procedures, powers, du-
ties, rights and liabilities of the various organs of government that are 
engaged in administering public policies.”16  This branch of law gov-
erns relations between government agencies and private enti-
ties/individuals that are affected by the power and duties of such 
agencies.17  Key powers and activities of public agencies are general-
ly controlled by administrative law.18  These include rule making, rule 
application and rule adjudication.19  One of the key functions of ad-
ministrative law is to ensure that the responsibilities, as well as opera-
tions, of public agencies are provided for and supported by law.20   
It has been argued that administrative law can play a critical role 
in the realization of good administration, the rule of law and mean-
ingful democracy in African countries, including Malawi.21  This is 
because it is considered to be a valuable tool for ensuring that indi-
vidual interactions with public officials are characterized by legality, 
fairness, impartiality, procedural propriety and respect for human 
rights generally.22  Apart from embracing the foregoing traditional 
values that have defined judicial review, administrative justice has 
adopted other values that characterize good governance.  These in-
clude transparency and accountability, fair procedures and due pro-
cesses, and citizen engagement.23  Through judicial review, adminis-
 
 16.  ANTHONY W. BRADLEY & KEITH. D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 657 (14th ed. 2007).  
 17.  Id. at 657–58. 
 18.  NEIL HAWKE & NEIL PARPWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 
(1998). 
 19. Simon Halliday & Colin David Scott, Administrative Justice, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer, eds., 2010); Al-
exander H. Türk, Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review, 19 EUR. L.J. 
126 (2013); Katie Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60(3) ADMIN. L. 
REV. 648 (2002); Rabie et al., supra note 11. 
 20.  Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
(HL) 410 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Diplock). 
 21. Migai Akech, Globalisation, the Rule of (Administrative) Law and the Realisation of 
Democratic Governance in Africa: Realities, Challenges and Prospects, 20 IND. J. GLOB. 
LEGAL STUD. 339, 343 (2013). 
 22.  Id. at 346. 
 23.  Gordon Anthony, Administrative Justice in the UK, 7 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 9, 10 
(2015); see also Kobus Müller, Environmental Governance in South Africa, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 68, 72 (H.A. Strydom & N.D. King eds., 
2d ed. 2009). 
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trative law empowers courts to check whether the actions of public 
agencies are confined within the scope of their authorizing laws and 
fundamental principles of administrative law.24 Administrative law is 
thus considered to be a tool for promoting administrative justice.25   
Administrative law is also believed to be a catalyst of better de-
cision-making beyond individual cases and has been said to be a 
stimulant for broader and systemic improvements in decision mak-
ing.26  In this regard, administrative law is said to be an invaluable 
tool for improving “the quality and consistency of government deci-
sion-making,” and for shaping “the way decision-makers exercise 
their functions.”27  Administrative law is also believed to be a tool for 
promoting public trust in government and public officers because it 
requires public officials to abide by the dictates of legality, rationality 
and procedural propriety.28  In this regard, administrative law is con-
sidered as an invaluable tool for promoting good governance and the 
rule of law.29 
However, from a methodological perspective, it is extremely dif-
ficult to determine the impact of administrative law on the practical 
operations of environmental agencies.30  This is because factors that 
inform and influence governance are complex and multifaceted.31  
The task of determining how administrative law impacts governance 
is made particularly complex by the profound changes that are taking 
place in the sphere of governance in most countries.32  For instance,  
contemporary administrative law and governance is increasingly 
 
 24.  Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
(HL) 410 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Diplock); see also Lord Dyson, Master of the 
Rolls, The Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture for the Judiciary of England and Wales: Is Judicial 
Review a Threat to Democracy (Nov. 2015), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/12/is-judicial-review-a-threat-to-democracy-mr.pdf.  
 25.  Anthony, supra note 23. 
 26.  John McMillan, Commonwealth Ombudsman, Whitmore Lecture: Can Administra-
tive Law Foster Good Administration? (Sept. 16, 2009), https://www.ombudsman.gov.au/ 
__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/31303/16-September-2009-Can-administrative-law-foster-good-
administration.pdf.   
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Akech, supra note 21, at 346. 
 29.  EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW A CORNER STONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE (Christopher 
Forsyth et al. eds., 2010). 
 30.  Hertogh & Halliday, supra note 13. 
 31.  Id.; see also Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency 
Rule-Makings: An Empirical Investigation, 53(5) WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1770 (2012), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3435&context=wmlr.   
 32.  See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H. Y. Chen eds., 2009). 
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characterized by what Jayasuriya terms ‘decentring.’33  Decentring, 
according to Jayasuriya, happens when “governance is located in 
multiple sites, engage[s] a number of non-state actors, and deploys a 
range of techniques of governance that move beyond the traditional 
structures of public law.”34  The realities of modern government are 
such that state power is sometimes exercised, or at least influenced, 
by entities outside traditional branches of government.35  Consequent-
ly, as Jayasuriya argues, “the exercise of public power is now taking 
place in sites outside the formal structures of governmental power, a 
process which decenters and fragments the state.”36  
The exercise of power outside the formal structures of govern-
mental power gradually erodes formal institutions of their monopoly 
over governance.37  Entities including, public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), transnational non-governmental standard-setting organiza-
tions,  Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), development partners, 
political parties, vigilantes, and other non-state actors are increasingly 
becoming involved in the exercise of state power.38  Ironically, some 
of  these entities are not subjected to administrative law.  According 
to Sedley, “with the systematic dispersal of the sites of power beyond 
the confines of what we had learned to recognize as the State, old cer-
tainties of public law are no longer there.”39  This renders it extremely 
difficult to determine the extent to which the operations of public 
agencies are influenced by administrative law or other external fac-
tors.  
        Against this background, this paper offers insights from recently 
conducted research on the implications of administrative law for en-
vironmental governance.  It will also shed light on how administra-
tive law is shaping environmental governance and the rule of law in 
the Malawian context. aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
 
 
 
 33.  Kanishka Jayasuriya, Riding on the Accountability Wave? Politics of Global Admin-
istrative Law, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 59 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H. Y. Chen eds., 2009). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  See id. 
 39.  Stephen Sedley, Foreword, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (Michael 
Taggart ed., 1997).  
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2. Judicial Review and Impact 
Judicial review by definition refers to the supervisory power of 
courts over the way public bodies exercise their powers and carry out 
their duties.40  In the present constitutional context, two kinds of judi-
cial review can be identified.  These are judicial review of adminis-
trative action and constitutional review.41  According to Justice 
Kapindu: 
[I]n modern day Malawian constitutional law there are 
two types of judicial review, viz: The former is the re-
view procedure by courts of conduct by public au-
thorities or bodies … The latter review process (Con-
stitutional judicial review) is premised on Section 
108(2) of the Constitution as read with Sections 4, 5, 
11(3), 12(1)(a) and 199 of the Constitution, where the 
Courts review conduct by the Government or law for 
consistency with the Constitution. It need not be ad-
ministrative action.42 
The focus of judicial review of administrative action is not on 
overturning decisions of public authorities that judges are uncomfort-
able with.43  Rather than consider merits of particular decisions, judi-
cial review primarily examines the process of decision-making to as-
certain that decisions have been validly made in compliance with the 
law.44  At common law, the broad grounds for challenging decisions 
of public authorities were outlined by Lord Diplock in Council of 
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service as ‘illegality’, 
‘irrationality’ and ‘procedural impropriety’.45 Illegality refers to fail-
ure to comply with statutory powers and duties; irrationality means 
failure to arrive at rational decisions or to follow a proper process of 
reasoning.46  Procedural impropriety, on the other hand embraces  
 
 
 40.  GOV’T LEGAL DEP’T, THE JUDGE OVER YOUR SHOULDER—A GUIDE TO GOOD 
DECISION MAKING 7 (1994), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads 
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746170/JOYS-OCT-2018.pdf (U.K.).   
 41.  Chirwa, supra note 2, at 117. 
 42.  State v. Council of the Univ. of Malawi, ex parte Univ. of Malawi Workers Trade 
Union [2015] Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 1, 13–14 (High Court of Malawi).  
 43.  ANDREW LE SUEUR & MAURICE SUNKIN, PUBLIC LAW 469 (1998). 
 44.  Ian David Turner, Judicial Review, Irrationality and the Review of Merits, 15 
NOTTINGHAM L. J. 37 (2006), http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/8961/1/8961_turner.pdf. 
 45.  [1985] 1 AC 374 (HL) 410 (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 46.  ANDREW LE SUEUR, JAVAN HERBERG & ROSALIND ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
LAW 227 (2d ed. 1999).  
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failure to comply with the common law duty to be fair and to adhere 
to laid down procedural standards.47  These include the duty to give a 
fair hearing and to avoid bias.48 
Most judicial review cases primarily focus on administrative ac-
tion.49  Section 43 of the Constitution provides for a right to lawful 
and procedurally fair administrative action.50  However, the Malawi 
Constitution does not define “administrative action.”51  Nonetheless, 
it empowers courts consider comparable foreign case law when inter-
preting its provisions.52  In this regard, deference is given to South 
African case law that interpreted Section 33 of the Constitution, 
which is identical to Section 43.53  Administrative action by definition 
refers to tasks of public officers that are public and administrative in 
nature.54  These actions include adjudicative administrative decisions, 
regulations, legislation and administrative decisions made by the ex-
ecutive branch of government.55  They may also include, passing of 
resolutions and implementation of legislation.56 
        It is widely believed that judicial review of agency rule-making, 
application and adjudication serves the public interest by helping to 
improve the quality of decision-making.57  This is especially so be-
cause judicial review is regarded as a useful tool for holding public 
officials accountable to aggrieved parties and the wider public.58  
Within the context of rule-making commentators note that judicial 
review operates as an institutional mechanism that guarantees that  
public authorities provide requisite information to interested parties, 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49. See Chirwa, supra note 2.  
 50.  Id. at 106. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALAWI § 11(c) (May 16, 1994) (Malawi) 
[hereinafter MALAWI CONSTITUTION]. 
 53.  Section 33 of the South African Constitution provides as follows: “(1) Everyone has 
the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. (2) Every-
one whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be 
given written reasons.” CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA Oct. 11, 1996, § 
33 (S. Afr.). 
 54.  President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. S. African Rugby Football Union, 2000 (1) 
SA 1 (CC) at ¶ 140 (S. Afr.); Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v. Greater Johannesburg Transna-
tional Metropolitan Council, 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 55. Kotzé, supra note 4, at 68.  
 56.  President of the Republic of S. Afr., supra note 54, ¶ 140; Fedsure Life Assurance 
Ltd, supra note 54.  
 57.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1717.   
 58.  Id. at 1723. 
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and take the views of interested parties seriously and make well-
reasoned decisions.59  The whole process of litigation enhances the 
visibility of particular issues and in turn facilitates accountability and  
transparency of rulemaking processes.60  Litigation according to 
Sunkin, “provides access to the government arena, helps to elicit an-
swers and information from public agencies and achieves publici-
ty.”61  As Wagner observes, “additional transparency benefits also ac-
crue ex post, after the rulemaking is briefed and resolved by the 
court.  The court’s opinions make the agency’s foibles more accessi-
ble to a broader audience, allowing political and related forces to 
sanction and discipline the agency.”62  The realization that decisions 
of public officers will be scrutinized and may be amenable to chal-
lenge also forces public officers to be accountable and helps them to 
enhance the quality of their decision-making.63 
Judicial review is also regarded as a valuable mechanism for 
guaranteeing that agencies confine their discretion, as well as the ap-
plication and interpretation of the rules within reasonable bounds.64  It 
serves as a reminder to public authorities that “there is an institution 
that can intervene to review” their decisions.65  Consequently, judicial  
review has a huge potential “to influence bureaucratic processes” and 
behavior beyond the courtroom.66 Judicial review is thus believed to 
be a tool for promoting good governance. 
While researchers have found it relatively easy to examine the 
impact of judicial review  in specific cases, they have found it more 
difficult to determine the legal, policy, or bureaucratic changes that 
are effected in administrative agencies following judicial review.67  
Growing evidence suggests that what happens in practice might not 
always reflect the conventional wisdom that judicial review neces-
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 1776.  
 61.  Maurice Sunkin, Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review 
on Government Bureaucracies, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 43, 47 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  MAURICE SUNKIN, DAVID ONG & ROBERT WIGHT, SOURCEBOOK ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 743 (2d ed. 2002). 
 64.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1724.  
 65.  Id. at 1756. 
 66.  Hertogh & Halliday, supra note 13, at 9.  
 67.  Peter Cane, Understanding Judicial Review and its Impact, in JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 15, 40 
(Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004); Sunkin, supra, note 61, at 56. 
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sarily results in improvement of the quality of decision-making.68  To 
this end, a number of administrative law scholars highlight the fact 
that judicial review sometimes tends to result in unintended or nega-
tive  consequences.69  Specifically, they note that judicial review has 
a tendency to impact more on administrative systems’, official defen-
siveness and bureaucratic behavior than the quality of decision-
making.70  These scholars note that contrary to conventional wisdom, 
judicial review might impose significant costs on public Agencies by 
encouraging more formality and emphasis on cumbersome proce-
dures, “at the possible expense of substance.”71  It might also incen-
tivize agencies to compromise on substantive aspects of rules in favor 
of procedural propriety, given that judicial review focuses on process 
as opposed to merits.72  
Similarly, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that 
the effect of judicial review on government policy is usually tempo-
rary and sometimes counterproductive.73  This evidence indicates that 
sometimes agencies consider judicial review as an unwelcome intru-
sion into their work.74  Apart from the general belief that it imposes 
substantial costs on public agencies, it is also believed that judicial 
review slows down decision-making processes.75  This is because 
public agencies “try to be very careful in their decisions to avoid 
[challenge] as best as they can.”76  Evidence in existing literature also 
reveals that public bodies have mixed motives for “being ‘more care-
ful.’”77  While some public officers have a genuine concern to intro-
duce good administrative practices in their daily undertakings, others 
may be motivated purely by the desire to “‘avoid’ future challenge” 
and seek proof against judicial review.78  Moreover, some public  
agencies do not always comply with the judicial directives.79  There is 
evidence in existing literature to the effect that it is common to see 
 
 68.  See BONDY ET AL., supra note 13. 
 69.  Genevra Richardson, Impact Studies in the United Kingdom, in JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 103, 
109, 113–14 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Richardson, supra note 69, at 114; see also BONDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 45–46. 
 72.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1770.  
 73.  Richardson, supra note 69, at 113–14. 
 74.  BONDY ET AL., supra note 13, at 45–46.  
 75.  Id. at 45. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1770.  
BANDA  
2019] AD. JUSTICE, ENV. GOVERNANCE & RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI 31 
agencies refusing to comply with Court directives that they consider 
as unwanted judicial encroachment into their turf.80  More subtle 
forms of non-compliance with judicial dictates have also been rec-
orded including reinterpretations of court rulings by agencies.81  
There also seems to be evidence of legal risk taking by agencies.82  
As Wagner observes: “Perhaps it is better to risk a remand or vacatur, 
for example, than to anger an influential constituent or find oneself 
crosswise with the Chief Executive.”83 
Commentators have also observed that sometimes judicial re-
view is met with outright hostility from public officials.  According 
to Tatel, environmental officials ordinarily have considerable tech-
nical expertise in their field and belong to the executive branch, 
which is considered politically accountable to the electorate.84  These 
specialist agencies consequently perceive the judges as “obstruction-
ist or even activist.”85 
        Moreover, it is also apparent that agencies are subjected to other 
forces of influence and pressures apart from judicial review.86  Con-
sequently, it is not always clear whether agencies act in a particular 
manner because of judicial influence or other influences.87  As Wag-
ner notes, “agencies do not generally treat court reprimands as hard 
constraints on their authority.”88  It would appear that sometimes a 
public official may find it more attractive to risk the wrath of the ju-
diciary “than to anger an influential constituent or to find oneself 
crosswise with the Chief Executive.”89  This, in turn, mitigates the 
stated benefits of judicial review.  The impact of judicial review on 
agency behavior thus remains generally unclear.  
 
 
 
 80.  Id. at 1731. 
 81.  Id.; see also Bradley C. Canon, Studying Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial 
Policies in the United States: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches, in JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 
76, 79–80 (Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday eds., 2004).  
 82.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1731–32. 
 83.  Id. at 1732. 
 84.  David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 34 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010).  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Cane, supra note 67, at 33. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1732. 
 89.  Id.  
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        Furthermore, judicial review is just one amongst many tools for 
achieving administrative justice.90  There are other tools at the dis-
posal of the citizenry including administrative tribunals, ombudsmen 
and alternative dispute resolution.91  It is therefore difficult to deter-
mine how these interact with judicial review to define the behavior of 
bureaucrats. 
Against this backdrop, this study sought to interrogate the signif-
icant disconnects between dominant understandings of judicial re-
view and the realities of rulemaking, application and adjudication.92 
D.  Methodology 
The study commenced with a comprehensive review of all the 
relevant literature on administrative law and governance.93  For this 
purpose, three main types of documentation were identified and re-
viewed to inform the development of the study’s conceptual and the-
oretical frameworks and the design of research instrument.  Docu-
ments reviewed included statutory and policy documents that set out 
the rule-making, application and adjudication mandates of   environ-
mental agencies sampled for the study, peer reviewed and academic 
literature, as well as official and semi-official reports and other doc-
uments and newspaper reports.  
Literature review was followed by key informant interviews 
which targeted a carefully selected sample of public officers, ordinary 
citizens and other stakeholders including Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs).94  The interviews were conducted in geographic sites that 
were purposively selected based on the objectives of the study and 
the imperative to cover the widest range of contexts in which envi-
ronmental governance is undertaken in Malawi.  Informed by these 
considerations, the sample of study sites included rural, urban and pe-
ri-urban centers.  The sample was also designed to purposively cover 
all the country’s three regions- Northern, Southern and Central.  Alt-
hough in all of the study sites interviews with key informants were 
considered adequate for establishing administrative practices by the  
 
 
 90.  Cane, supra note 67, at 18.  
 91.  Anthony, supra note 23, at 9.  
 92.  CHIKOSA BANDA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN 
MALAWI: RESEARCH REPORT 13 (2018). 
 93.  RICHARD TAMBULASI & KONDWANI FARAI CHIKADZA, SOCIAL SCIENTIST REPORT: 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN EAST AFRICA RESEARCH PROJECT 6 (2018).  
 94.  Id. at 3–4. 
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various environmental actors, the study also used observation and fo-
cus group discussions as means to gather data which was used to con-
firm the findings yielded by the interviews. 
II. NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 
A. Constitutional Principles Underlying Environmental 
Management  
The Constitution is the supreme law of Malawi.95  Like other 
Constitutions, it defines the basic framework for government, the op-
erations of its branches, and the fundamental rights of citizens.96  Of 
particular importance for environmental rule-making, application and 
adjudication is covered in Sections 5 and 199, which enshrine the 
principle of constitutional supremacy.97  Section 5 provides that “any 
act of Government or any law that is inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be inva-
lid.”98  This provision impacts environmental governance insofar as it 
subjects all rule-making, application and adjudication functions of 
environmental agencies to the test of constitutionality.99  Courts have 
a duty to ensure that public agencies exercise their functions in ac-
cordance with the Constitution.100  Section 108(2) gives the High 
Court “original jurisdiction to review any law, and any action or deci-
sion of the Government, for conformity with [the] Constitution.”101  
 
 95.  Justin Kalima, Environment and Development in Malawi – Any Balancing of Inter-
ests, in THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AFRICA 219, 228 (Mi-
chael Faure & Willemien du Plesis eds., 2011); MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, § 5; 
see also MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, § 199 (providing as follows: “This Consti-
tution shall have the status as supreme law and there shall be no legal and political authority 
save as is provided by or under this Constitution”). 
 96.  ELLIOT BULMER, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE,  WHAT IS 
A CONSTITUTION: PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 3 (2d ed. 2004). 
 97.  Section 5 of the Constitution stipulates that “any act of government or any law that 
is inconsistent with provisions of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency 
be invalid.” MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, § 5. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See id. This is in line with Section 4 of the Constitution which provides that “this 
Constitution shall bind all executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State at all levels 
of government.” MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, § 4; see also Mayeso Gwanda v. 
State et al. [2015] Constitutional Case No. 5, 6 (High Court of Malawi) (holding that the 
Court is mandated to “declare any law invalid if it inconsistent with the Constitution”). 
 100.  According to Section 9 of the Constitution, “the Judiciary shall have the responsi-
bility of interpreting, protecting and enforcing the Constitution and all laws in accordance 
with this Constitution….” MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, § 9.  
 101.  See Nangwale v. Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly [2005] MWHC 80, Miscellaneous 
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One of the most important milestones in the history of Malawi’s 
environmental law has arguably been the incorporation of an envi-
ronmental management provision in Section 13 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Malawi, 1995.102  Section 13(d) provides a constitu-
tional basis for environmental rulemaking and rule application in Ma-
lawi by setting out the specific goals that the State must pursue in the 
field of the environment.103  The Section requires the government to 
progressively adopt and implement laws and policies aimed at man-
aging the environment responsibly.104  The principles of national poli-
cy, according to Section 14 of the Constitution, are merely “directory 
in nature.”105  However, courts are entitled to take them into consider-
ation when “interpreting and applying any of the provisions of [the] 
Constitution or of any law or in determining the validity of decisions 
of the executive and in the interpretation of the provisions of [the] 
Constitution.”106  
It is generally believed that the principles of national policy are 
of unclear status and may not therefore be equated to constitutional 
rights.107  But there have been judicial pronouncements which suggest 
to the contrary. One such pronouncement was made in the Phillipine 
case of Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S Factoran, Jr.et al.108  In this case, 
the Supreme Court of the Philippines was asked to determine the sta-
tus of ‘the right to a balanced and healthful ecology’ which is con-
tained in the ‘Declaration of Principles and State Policies’ part of the 
Constitution.109  The Court observed that the inclusion of the right in  
 
 
 
Civil Case No. 1 (High Court of Malawi), https://malawilii.org/mw/judgment/high-court-
general-division/2005/80. 
 102. GOV’T OF MALAWI, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, Clause 1.4 (2004), 
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mlw169499.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY]. 
 103.  Kalima, supra note 95, at 235. 
 104.  Id.; see also FIDELIS KANYONGOLO, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MALAWI- 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN EAST AFRICA RESEARCH 8 (2018). 
 105.  Kalima, supra note 95, at 235–36. 
 106.  MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, § 14; see also Administrator of the Estate 
of Dr. Kamuzu Banda v. Attorney General [2004] MWHC 3, Civil Cause No. 1839 (A) of 
(1997), 17 (High Court of Malawi) (Justice Chimasula Phiri); Gable Masangano v. Attorney 
General & Others [2009] MWHC 31, Constitutional Cause No. 15 of 2007 (High Court of 
Malawi). 
 107.  Carl Bruch et al., Breathing Life into Fundamental Principles: Implementing Con-
stitutional Environmental Protections in Africa, 7 S. AFR. J. ENVTL. L. POL’Y. 21, 36 (2000). 
 108.  G.R. No.101083 (S.C., Jul. 30, 1993) (Phil.). 
 109.  UNEP, COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO 
ENVIRONMENT: NATIONAL DECISIONS 24–25, 29 (1998). 
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the Declaration of Principles section, as opposed to the Bill of Rights, 
did not make it any “less important than any of the civil and political 
rights enumerated in the latter.”110   
Apart from explicitly including the environment in the principles 
of national policy, the Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights 
which enshrines human rights that are pertinent to environmental 
management.111  Specifically, Section 43 provides for administrative 
justice.112  It stipulates that every person shall have the right to—  
(a) lawful and procedurally fair administrative action, 
which is justifiable in relation to reasons given where 
his or her rights, freedoms, legitimate expectations or 
interests are affected or threatened; and 
(b) be furnished with reasons, in writing, for adminis-
trative action where his or her rights, freedoms, legit-
imate expectations or interests are affected.113 
        There have been some judicial pronouncements to the effect that 
Section 43 merely restates the common law principles of natural jus-
tice.114  However, these decisions have been criticized by some com-
mentators.  Chirwa, for instance, contends that the Constitution “pro-
vides for new and expansive grounds for review than was the case 
under the common law.”115  He notes that the notion of lawfulness 
under Section 43 is wider than the notion of legality under the com-
mon law.116  This, according to Chirwa, is because in determining 
whether a public officer acted lawfully, the Court will not merely 
 
 110.  Id.; see also Kinkri Devi & Anor v. State of Himashal Pradesh and Ors, (1988) AIR 
4 PC (1987) (India). 
 111.  These include, the right to life (Section 16, the right to property (Section 28), the 
right to economic activity (Section 29), the right to development (Section 30) and the right of 
access to information (Section 37). MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, §§ 28–30, 37. 
 112.  Chirwa, supra note 2, at 106.  
 113.  MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, §§ 43(a) & (b). 
 114.  In Chawani v. Attorney General, Justice Tambala observed as follows: “In our 
view, Section 43 of the Constitution is simply an entrenchment of the principles of natural 
justice which requires that no person shall be condemned without being heard. The section 
has of course stretched the principle a bit to include the requirement to give reasons which 
must support an administrative action.” MCSA Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2000 (unreported) 
[2000-2001] MLR 79.83 (MSCA) (Malawi); see also Attorney General v. Lunguzi & An-
other [1996] 19 MLR 8 (MSCA) (Malawi). There are a number of pronouncements from the 
High Court that echo the Supreme Court’s position. These include, Zaibula v. Council of the 
University of Malawi [1997] 1 MLR 356; Mbewe v. Registered Trustees of Blantyre Ad-
ventist Hospital [1997]1 MLR 403; and Buliyani v. Malawi Book Service [1994] MLR 24.  
 115.  Chirwa, supra note 2, at 108.  
 116.  Id. 
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consider whether he or she acted intra-vires.117  It may also consider 
whether the officer complied with the Constitution.118  Procedural 
fairness is broader than the compliance with rules of natural justice 
and reflects the general duty to act fairly.119  Furthermore, the Consti-
tutional right to reasons, in writing, for decisions that affect an indi-
vidual’s rights, interests and legitimate expectations is not available 
within the common law.120  Chirwa also correctly opines that Section 
43 provides for justification as a ground for review.121  Chirwa ob-
serves that the requirement that administrative action should be justi-
fiable in relation to reasons given is much broader than the ground of 
irrationality under the common law.122   
          Chirwa’s observations find support in a minority judicial opin-
ion.123  In the High Court case of The State v. Blantyre City Assembly, 
ex.p. Ngwala124 Justice Mwaungulu opined that the statements made 
by some Judges that Section 43 merely repeats the principles of natu-
ral justice were “not very accurate conceptually.”125  Mwaungulu’s 
opinion finds support in South African jurisprudence.126  In the case 
of Van Huyssteen & Others v. Minister of Environmental Affairs & 
Tourism & Others,127 for example, the High Court of South Africa 
disagreed with the contention that Section 24(b) of the South African 
Constitution (a provision in the South African interim Constitution128 
which was identical to Section 43) merely codified the common law 
principles of natural justice. Justice Farmlam observed as follows:  
 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  See Re H.K. (an infant), [1967] 2 QB 617; Van Huyssteen & Others v. Minister of 
Envt’l Affairs & Tourism & Others (1998) 1SA 283. 
 120.  The Supreme Court recognized this point in Chawani v. Attorney General, [2000-
2001] MLR 79, and observed that Section 43 has stretched the principles of natural justice to 
include the duty to give reasons.  
 121.  Chirwa, supra note 2, at 109. 
 122.  Id.; see also Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of 
Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 31 (1994).  
 123.  State v. Blantyre City Assembly ex parte Ngwala, Miscellaneous Civil Application 
No. 183 of 2012 (High Court of Malawi). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 3.  
 126. See, e.g., Police & Prison Civil Rights Union v. Minister of Correctional Services & 
Others 1999, Case No. D511/99 (Labor Court of South Africa), ¶¶ 55–56 (S. Afr.); 
Van Huyssteen & Others v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism & Others 1998 (1) SA 283 
(C) (S. Afr.). 
 127.  UNEP, supra note 109, at 59.  
 128.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Apr. 27, 1994, Act 200.  
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Mr. Helberg contended that s 24(b) merely codifies 
the common law relating to natural justice … I cannot 
agree with this submission … I do not think that one 
can regard s 24(b) as codifying the existing law and 
thus read down, as it were, the wide language of the 
paragraph, unless the existing law was already so wide 
and flexible that it was covered by the concept of pro-
cedural fairness.129  
Mwaungulu’s opinion also finds support in the case of President 
of the Republic of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football Un-
ion, in which the Constitutional Court observed as follows:   
Although the right to just administrative action was 
entrenched in our Constitution in recognition of the 
importance of the common law governing administra-
tive review, it is not correct to see [S]ection 33 as a 
mere codification of common law principles. The right 
to just administrative action is now entrenched as a 
constitutional control over the exercise of power. Prin-
ciples previously established by the common law will 
be important though not necessarily decisive, in de-
termining not only the scope of [S]ection 33, but also 
its content. The principal function of [S]ection 33 is to 
regulate conduct of the public administration, and, in 
particular, to ensure that where action taken by the 
administration affects or threatens individuals, the 
procedures followed comply with the constitutional 
standards of administrative justice. These standards 
will, of course, be informed by the common law prin-
ciples developed over decades.130 
Academic commentators have also supported the argument that 
the administrative justice clause does not merely reinstate common 
law rules.131  Rather it affords the courts a chance to consider the 
“merits of a decision by developing a theory of what is desirable.”132 
In this context, De Ville argues that Section 24 of the South African 
Constitution, which is identical to its counterpart in Section 43 of the 
 
 129.  UNEP, supra note 109, at 59, 73. 
 130.  2000 (1) SA 1 (CC), ¶¶ 135–36 (S. Afr.). 
 131.  GLAZEWISKI, supra note 6, at 97; Jacques De Ville, Proportionality as a Require-
ment of the Legality in Administrative Law in Terms of the New Constitution, S. AFR. PUB. L. 
360, 361 (1994). 
 132.  De Ville, supra note 131.  
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Malawi Constitution, introduces the continental notion of proportion-
ality into administrative law.133  Justifiability, according to De Ville, 
demands that administrative action be “suitable and necessary to at-
tain the statutorily prescribed purpose and which does not result in 
harm to an individual(s) which is out of proportion to the gains to the 
community,” justifiability cannot just be equated to rationality.134  
The foregoing position finds support in judicial opinion from 
South Africa.135  In the South African case of Roman v. Williams,136 
Justice Van Deventer cited with approval DeVille’s writings.137  He 
observed as follows: “[J]udicial review no longer has an independent 
existence apart from constitutional review, which casts the net much 
wider and renders the common law irrelevant in this case, as I said 
earlier.  In my view the constitutional test of legality clearly overrides 
the common law review grounds.”138 
The incorporation of Section 43 into the Malawi Constitution 
has profound implications for administrative law generally, environ-
mental rule-making, and rule application and rule adjudication.  This 
is especially so because the Section reflects a rights-based approach 
to administrative justice. Under the common-law, the onus of proving 
whether a public officer has breached his legal duty or acted ultra 
vires is on the claimant.139  However, the rights-based approach im-
poses the onus of justifying why a citizen’s right to administrative 
justice should be interfered with on the public officer.140  According- 
 
 133.  Id. at 361.  
 134.  Id. at 365. 
 135. See, e.g., Kotzé v. Minister of Health 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (S. Afr.).   
 136.  Roman v. Williams 1997 (4) All SA 210 (CC) (S. Afr.).   
 137.  Id. at 219 (“I have borrowed extensively from the excellent synopsis of South Afri-
can comparative foreign authority and well-founded submissions of JR de Ville in his arti-
cles “Proportionality as a requirement of the legality in administrative law in terms of the 
new Constitution”, published in 1994, and “The Right to Administrative Justice: An Exami-
nation of Section 24”, which was written in 1995 with reference to section 24 of the Interim 
Constitution Act. I find myself fully in agreement with the learned author that the constitu-
tional test imports the requirement of proportionality between means and end and that the 
role of the courts in judicial reviews is no longer limited to the way in which an administra-
tive decision was reached but now extends to its substance and merits.”). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  T. R. Hickman, The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing its Place in the Public 
Sphere, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 166, 186 (2004).  
 140.  Id.; see also Thomas Poole, The Reformation of English Administrative Law, 2 (L. 
Soc’y Econ., Society and Economy Working Paper 12/2007, 2007); see also M. Taggart, 
“The Tub of Public Law,” in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 475 (D. Dyzenhaus ed., 2004); Ja-
son Varuhas, The Reformation of English Administrative Law? Rights, Rhetoric and Reality, 
13 (Legal Research Paper Series University of Cambridge, 2013); LE SUEUR, HERBERG & 
ENGLISH, supra note 46, at 478. 
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ly, it provides a basis for challenging the manner in which environ-
mental agencies make rules, apply rules and adjudicate upon matters 
related to environmental management.  
The inclusion of Section 43 in the Malawi Constitution makes it 
imperative for administrative law scholars to endeavour to understand 
the effect of the constitutional order on administrative law and the ex-
tent to which the above provisions impact on the work of environ-
mental agencies.  Unfortunately, there is a dearth of literature in this 
regard.  This paper thus attempts to shed some light on this issue. 
B. Framework Legislation 
Like many other countries, Malawi reformed its environmental 
policies and laws following the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
the Environment and Development (UNCED).141  The policy and law 
reform process commenced in 1994 with the development of the Na-
tional Environmental Action Plan.142  It culminated in the develop-
ment of the National Environmental Policy and the Environment 
Management Act (EMA 1996) in 1996.143  The EMA 1996 provides 
for “the protection and management of the environment and the con-
servation and sustainable utilization of natural resources.”144  The sa-
lient features of the Act include  the provision of an elaborate institu-
tional framework for the coordination of environmental rule-making, 
rule-implementation and rule adjudication in Malawi.145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 141.   SOSTEN CHIOTHA ET AL., MALAWI’S PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: 20 YEARS SINCE THE 1992 EARTH SUMMIT IN RIO 5, 7–8 (2012), 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1037malawi.pdf.  
 142.  Id. at 5; MALAWI GOV., THE MALAWI NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN 
(1994), https://cepa.rmportal.net/Library/governmentpublications/National%20Environment 
al%20Action%20Plan%20Vol%20I%201994.pdf/view; Redson Kapindu & Justin Kalima, 
Wither to Malawi? A Brief Statement of the Law on the Environment in Malawi (Un-
published 2015), at 3. 
 143.  Kapindu & Kalima, supra note 142, at 3; GRACIAN ZIBELU BANDA, REVISION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT ACT: DRAFT REPORT 2 (2004). 
 144.  Environmental Management Act (Act No. 23 of 1996) (Malawi) [hereinafter EMA 
1996].  
 145.  BANDA, supra note 143, at 2. 
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        It is worth noting that Parliament recently enacted the Environ-
ment Management Act, 2017.146  The Act, inter alia, repeals the EMA  
1996.147  However, it is not yet in force.148  It will only come into 
force upon being assented to by the President and after being pub-
lished in the Gazette by the Minister.149 
C. Sectoral Legislation 
One defining characteristic of Malawi’s environmental law is its 
diffuse nature.  Environmental law is provided for in a wide range of 
Acts of Parliament and subsidiary legislation.150  No single legal in-
strument comprehensively makes provisions for environmental rule-
making, application and adjudication in Malawi.  While the Envi-
ronment Management Act of 1996 attempts to provide for an over-
arching legal framework and coordination mechanism for environ-
mental management in Malawi, it falls short of regulating all aspects 
of the environment.151  Consequently, the government has developed 
or revised sector specific legislation to regulate environmental and 
natural resource management in various sectors.152 Sector specific 
laws include the Forestry Act, 1998, Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act, 1997, the National Parks and Wildlife Act, 1992, 
the Water Resources Act, 2013, Water-Works Act, 1995, and Public 
Health Act, 1948.153  
However, the EMA 1996 still remains the overarching statute on 
environmental management, until the time it will be replaced by the 
EMA 2017.154  All the sectoral laws are subordinate to it.155  Section 7 
 
 146.  Environmental Management Act (Act No. 19 of 2017) (Malawi) [hereinafter EMA 
2017]. 
 147.  See id. § 118.  
 148.  Information sourced from the office of the Chief Legislative Counsel in the Minis-
try of Justice. 
 149.  EMA 2017, supra note 146, § 1. 
 150.  See Kapindu & Kalima, supra note 142, at 6. 
 151.  See Tracy Dobson, Radical Restructuring of Environmental Policy to Preserve Bio-
diversity in Southern Africa: Malawi at the Crossroads, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 
149, 162–66 (1997).  
 152.  See ENVTL. AFFAIRS DEPT., MALAWI STATE OF ENVIRONMENT AND OUTLOOK 
REPORT: ENVIRONMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 265 (2010); see also NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 102, iii.  
 153.  See generally GRACIAN ZIBELU BANDA & THOKOZANI JAMES NGWIRA, 
INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MALAWI (2007). 
 154.  Gift Dorothy Makanje, The Environment Management Act (2017) and Natural Re-
sources Regulation in Malawi: Opportunities and Limitations for Effective Enforcement, in 
LAW  ENVIRONMENT AFRICA 393 (Patricia Kameri Mbote et al. eds, 2019). 
    155.  EMA 1996, supra note 144, § 7. 
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of the EMA renders any written law on the protection and manage-
ment of the environment that is inconsistent with any of its provisions 
invalid to the extent of such inconsistency.156 
D. Institutional Framework 
Part III of the EMA 1996 outlines the institutional framework 
for environmental management in Malawi.157  Section 8(1) of the 
EMA 1996 places the Minister at the helm of environmental man-
agement.  The Section recognizes the Minister as the main duty-
bearer for environmental protection and management in Malawi.158 
The Section explicitly requires the Minister to take necessary 
measures for achieving its objectives in consultation with lead agen-
cies.159  Section 9 of the EMA 1996 establishes the office of Director 
of Environmental Affairs.160  The Director’s Office “is responsible to 
the Minister for the proper discharge of his functions under [the] Act 
and for the implementation of such policies relating to the protection 
and management of the environment and the conservation and sus-
tainable utilization of natural resources[.]”161  The Director heads the 
Department of Environmental Affairs, which is responsible for coor-
dination of environmental management in Malawi.162  The above sce-
nario will change once the EMA 2016 becomes operational.163  Sec-
tion 7 of the EMA 2016 establishes the Malawi Environmental 
Protection Authority which “shall be the principal agency for the pro-
tection and management of the environment.”164 
The diffuse nature of environmental law in Malawi means that 
there is no agency that is solely responsible for environmental rule-
making, as well as rule application and rule-adjudication in Mala-
wi.165  Apart from the Department of Environmental Affairs, there are  
no less than fifteen lead agencies responsible for rule-making, appli-
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. §§ 8–18.  
 158.  Id. § 8(1) (providing that “[i]t shall be the duty of the Minister to promote the pro-
tection and management of the environment and the conservation and sustainable utilization 
of natural resources”). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. § 9(1). 
 161.  Id. § 9(2)(b).   
 162.  MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV’T & RURAL DEV., REVISED DECENTRALIZED 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 6 (2012). 
 163.  The EMA 2016 establishes a different institutional framework for environmental 
management. Environmental Management Act (Act No. 19 of 2016) (Malawi). 
 164.  Id. § 7(1). 
 165.  MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV’T & RURAL DEV., supra note 162, at 4–13. 
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cation and adjudication in the environmental arena.166  The key play-
ers in this sector are government departments including Forestry and 
Climate Change and Meteorological Services.167  Environmental 
management functions at local authority level fall under the mandate 
of Councils.168  The Local Government Act 1998 gives Council pow-
er to make by-laws.169 
The multiplicity of agencies in the environmental sector almost 
invariably gives rise to fragmentation, jurisdictional conflicts and 
overlapping functions.170  This creates the potential for rule incoher-
ence, overlaps and contradictions.171  For example, Section 30 of the 
EMA authorizes the Minister responsible for environmental affairs to 
“prescribe environmental quality standards generally and, in particu-
lar, for air, water … effluent and solid waste.”172  Section 91 of the 
Water Resources Act gives the Minister responsible for water the 
power to “prescribe standards of effluent quality.”173  Legal frame-
works of this nature, as some commentators have observed, have the 
potential to generate conflicts of jurisdiction and “confusion of roles 
among actors.”174  Such legal frameworks, also have implications for  
administrative justice and good environmental governance in so far  
as they give rise to disjointed and uncoordinated decision making 
processes.175 
 
 166.  These Lead Agencies administer and enforce environmental laws relating to water, 
air, land, fisheries, forestry, national parks and wildlife, pollution and waste management, 
and public health. See MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV’T & RURAL DEV., supra note 162; BANDA & 
NGWIRA, supra note 153. 
 167. MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV’T & RURAL DEV., supra note 162, at 5; see also Tracy 
Dobson, Community Participation in Natural Resources Management in Malawi: Charting a 
New Course for Sustainability, 10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153 (1999).  
 168.  MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV’T & RURAL DEV., supra note 162, at 8–9. 
 169.  Local Government Act (Act No. 42 of 1998), §§ 103, 6(1)(f) (Malawi). 
 170.  M.A. Rabie et al., Environment Conservation Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 99, 101 (R.F Fuggle & M.A Rabie eds., 2000). 
 171.  In fact, the National Environmental Policy, 2004, indicates that sectoral environ-
mental laws and policies are characterized by “gaps, conflicts and duplications which ad-
versely affect [their] effective implementation.” NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra 
note 102, iii. 
 172.  EMA 1996, supra note 144, § 30(1). 
 173.  Water Resources Act (Act No. 2 of 2013), § 91 (Malawi). Section 85 of the Water 
Resources Act, for example, authorizes and empowers the Water Resources Authority to de-
clare certain areas to be protected areas. Id. § 85. This is where doing so may be necessary to 
protect catchment areas from deforestation. The Minister of Environmental Affairs has simi-
lar powers under Section 32 of the EMA. EMA 1996, supra note 144, § 32.   
 174.  TAM O’NEIL ET AL., ODI, FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN MALAWI 21 (2014), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publica 
tions-opinion-files/8943.pdf.  
 175.  JG Nel & LJ Kotzé, Environmental Management: An Introduction, in 
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III. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, STANDING AND ACCESS TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
The effectiveness of judicial review as a tool for promoting en-
vironmental accountability largely depends on the participation of a 
wide range of affected interests in the judicial review process.176  In 
order to participate effectively in environmental management, citi-
zens need to be guaranteed the right of access to courts and tribunals 
to enable them to challenge environmental decisions.177 
An important issue once thought to have been settled, that has 
generated a lot of controversy, is whether citizen groups, as opposed 
to individual citizens, would have the right to commence proceedings 
for infringement of the right to a clean and healthy environment.178 
However, Malawi, like other common law jurisdictions, has tradi-
tionally required applicants to demonstrate a degree of sufficient in-
terest in a matter in order to have standing to challenge an action by a 
public agency.179  The absence of liberalized standing rules, as well as 
reasonably accessible and low cost access to courts, makes it difficult 
for public-spirited individuals/entities “of all sizes and resource levels 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 18 (H.A. Strydom & N.D. King eds., 2d 
ed. 2009). 
 176.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1732. 
 177.  This is in line with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel-
opment 1992 which provides as follows: “Environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. … Effective access to judicial 
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” U.N. Con-
ference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, Principle 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter 
Rio Declaration]. 
 178.  See Dobson, Radical Restructuring, supra note 151, at 163–64. The issue was 
thought to have been settled by Justice Chimasula in Administrator of the Estate of Dr. 
Kamuzu Banda v. Attorney General, [2004] MWHC 3, Civil Cause No. 1839 (A) of (1997), 
17 (High Court of Malawi). 
 179.  UDF v. Attorney General, High Court, Civil Cause No. 11 of 1994. In President of 
Malawi and Another v. Kachere and Others, the Supreme Court observed as follows: 
 
            [T]he powers of the court to . make a binding declaratory judgment is discreti- 
            onary. This being the case the plaintiff must have locus standi, that is, a real  
            interest which he wants to protect. If he has no interest, such declaratory jud- 
            gement may not be granted. For example, a declaratory judgment may not be  
            granted to a plaintiff whose claim is too indirect and insubstantial and could  
            not give him any relief in “any real sense” … A person who has no sufficient  
            interest in the matter has no right to ask a court of law to give him a  
            declaratory judgment. He must have a legal right of substantial interest in the  
            matter in which he seeks a declaration. “Sufficient interest” is the one which is  
            over and above the general interest. [1995] MWSC 2, MSCA Civil Appeal No.  
            20 of (1995) (internal citation omitted). 
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to challenge unfair rules and raise them for public scrutiny.”180  The  
standing requirement may prove to be a substantial hurdle to citizen 
participation in environmental management.  Section 15 of the Con-
stitution provides as follows:  
Any person or group of persons with sufficient interest 
in the protection and enforcement of rights under this 
Chapter shall be entitled to the assistance of the courts, 
the Ombudsman, the Human Rights Commission and 
other organs of Government to ensure the promotion, 
protection and redress of grievances in respect of those 
rights.181 
Section 5 of the EMA 1996 provides for the right to a clean and 
healthy environment.182  It also stipulates that for purposes of enforc-
ing this right, “any person may bring an action in the High Courts.”183  
However, commentators seem to disagree on the meaning of the 
above provision.184  The major bone of contention is whether the pro-
vision allows for a fairly flexible approach to locus standi.185  One 
school of thought argues that the flexibility of the wording of this 
Section would embrace persons who have not suffered a direct viola-
tion of the right to a decent environment, including ‘public-spirited’ 
individuals.186  Others, however, contend that the way the provision is 
drafted still requires applicants to have locus standi to commence le-
gal proceedings.187  
         The only judicial interpretation of Section 5 suggests that courts 
may be willing to interpret this provision liberally.188  In Estate of Dr. 
H. Kamuzu Banda v. Attorney General, Justice Chimasula held that  
 
 
 
 
 180.  Wagner, supra note 31, at 1724. 
 181.  MALAWI CONSTITUTION, supra note 52, art. 15.  
 182.  EMA 1996, supra note 144, § 5(1). 
 183.  Id. § 5(2).   
 184.  See, e.g., BANDA & NGWIRA, supra note 153, at 13–14; Dobson, Radical Restructur-
ing, supra note 151, at 163–64; Kapindu & Kalima, supra note 142, at 21.  
 185.  BANDA & NGWIRA, supra note 153, at 13–14. 
 186.  RALPH KASAMBARA, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS LITIGATION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY, APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION AND ADVOCACY IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA [25], 39–41 (IUCN, Regional Office for Southern Africa ed., 2002).  
 187.  BANDA & NGWIRA, supra note 153, at 27–29.  
 188.  See Administrator of the Estate of Dr. Kamuzu Banda v. Attorney General [2004] 
MWHC 3, Civil Cause No. 1839 (A) of (1997), 17 (High Court of Malawi). 
BANDA  
2019] AD. JUSTICE, ENV. GOVERNANCE & RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI 45 
the right to a clean and healthy environment was not localised and the 
words ‘any person’ should not be interpreted in an orthodox man-
ner.189  He observed as follows:  
In recognition of the pressing need to preserve the en-
vironment, the Environment Management Act has 
given locus standi to ‘any person’ to bring suits to en-
force the right to a clean and healthy environment, 
which right is, of course, also not localized.  In a nut-
shell, the Environmental Management Act departs 
from orthodox requirements for locus standi and gives 
any person the right to involve himself or herself in 
environmental litigation.190 
        Justice Chimasula’s position, which has been incorporated into 
the recently enacted EMA 2016, represents a progressive approach to 
standing.191  Section 4 of the EMA 2016 provides for the “right to a 
clean and healthy environment” and the “duty to safeguard and en-
hance the environment.”192  In order to ensure that this right is real-
ised in practice, this Section entitles persons who are interested in en-
forcing the right to a clean and healthy environment to commence 
legal proceedings against persons whose activities are potentially del-
eterious to the environment.193  The most significant reform to the law 
of standing in environmental law is Section 4(5) of the EMA 2016.  
The subsection stipulates as follows: “Any person proceeding under 
subsection (4) shall have the capacity to bring an action notwithstand-
ing that the person cannot show that the defendant’s act or omission 
has caused or is likely to cause him any personal loss or injury[.]”194  
The subsection contains two proviso aimed at avoiding floodgates of 
litigation, the legal action must not be frivolous or vexatious and it 
must not be an abuse of court process.195  
 
 
 
 
 
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
 191. See EMA 2016, supra note 163, § 4(5). 
 192.  Id. §4(1). 
 193.  Id. § 4(4).  
 194.  Id. § 4(5).   
 195.  Id. § 4(5)(a)–(b). 
BANDA  
46 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34:2 
       The EMA 2016 is not yet in force and cannot be invoked in a 
court of law.196  However, once it comes into force, it will bring the 
much needed certainty to controversies around standing in environ-
mental law.  It will also open up opportunities for environmental  
NGOs and public- spirited individuals to use their competences and 
expertise to promote good governance and the rule of law in the envi-
ronmental sector.  
In the interim, the status quo remains.  Estate of Dr. H. Kamuzu 
Banda v. Attorney General still remains one of the best precedents 
that environmental activists can use in order to promote the right to a 
clean and healthy environment.197  Moreover, the decision of the Su-
preme Court in the Case of Civil Liberties Committee v. Ministry of 
Justice and Registrar General,198 suggests that courts may be more 
willing to embrace a liberal approach where the concerned NGO spe-
cializes in the promotion and protection of a particular right.  A re-
cent decision of the High Court in State v. Lilongwe Water Board, 
Minister of Irrigation and Water Development, The Director of Envi-
ronmental Affairs, The Minister of Natural Resources Energy and 
Mining, and Khato Civils Proprietory Ltd, ex parte Malawi Law So-
ciety199 supports this conclusion.  In confirming that the Malawi Law 
Society had standing to commence proceedings in this case, Justice 
Kapindu observed as follows: 
The Applicant states that the matters that it raises are 
matters of public interest and are intended to protect 
the public on an issue that directly touches on the law, 
namely compliance with various legal processes relat-
ing to environmental protection before a project of the 
nature of the instant one is commenced. Prima facie, I 
agree that this is indeed a matter of public interest and 
that the MLS has a legal duty to take measures intend-
ed at protecting the public, within the meaning of Sec-
tion 26(1)(d) of the [Legal Education and Legal Practi-
tioners Act].200 
 
 
 
 196.  Information sourced from the Chief Legislative Council, Ministry of Justice; see 
also EMA 2016, supra note 163. 
 197.  See Kapindu & Kalima, supra note 142, at 21.  
 198.  [2004] MWSC 1, Civil Appeal No. 12 of (1999), 12–13 (Malawi Supreme Court of 
Appeal). 
 199.  Judicial Review Cause No. 16 of (2017) (High Court of Malawi).   
 200.  Id. ¶ 1.13. 
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IV. Administrative Justice and Environmental Governance 
A. Legality and Irrationality  
One of the cardinal principles of good administration is that 
those who make decisions should have “legal authority for their ac-
tions.”201  A decision maker must have an accurate understanding of 
the law that governs his “decision-making power and must give effect 
to it.”202  This study concluded “that compliance with legislation is 
not a simple matter in practice.”203  Additionally, it was found that 
“while the mandates of various environmental agencies appear clear 
on paper, the situation is more complex on the ground.”204  The study 
also found that “public officers sometimes fail to appreciate that 
statutory powers may only be performed by those who have the 
power to do so.”205  The study added that the “involvement of 
‘informal’ actors in rule application processes (albeit behind the 
scenes) also adversely impacts the legality of decisions.”206  The Thin 
Plastics Ban Cases illustrate the above point. 207 
In December 2012, the Secretary for the Environment made a 
decision to ban the production, importation and distribution of thin 
plastics with effect from April 30, 2019.208  Prior to the enforcement 
of the ban, the Department of Environmental Affairs convened a 
meeting of various stakeholders, including the Plastic Manufacturers 
Association of Malawi, to solicit feedback on this issue.209  Among 
the concerns raised by stakeholders was that the notice given for en-
forcement was too short.210  This was because both the manufacturers 
and consumers required more time to clear existing stocks and raw 
 
 201.  GOV’T LEGAL DEP’T, supra note 40, at 7.   
 202.  Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 
(HL) 410 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 203.  BANDA, supra note 92, at 42.  
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id.  
 207.  See State v. Secretary for Env’t & Climate Change Management, ex parte Vijay 
Kumar on Behalf of the Members of the Plastic Manufacturers Association of Malawi 
[2014] Judicial Review Cause No. 54 (High Court of Malawi); State v. Director of Envtl. 
Affairs, ex parte Aero Plastic Indus. Ltd. t/a Rainbow Plastics & 12 Others, Judicial Cause 
No. 20 of 2016 (High Court of Malawi) [hereinafter Aero Plastic Indus.]. 
 208. Malawi Introduces a Ban on Thin Plastics, UNDP MALAWI (Sept. 8, 2018), 
http://www.mw.undp.org/content/malawi/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/09/08/malawi-
introduces-ban-on-thin-plastic.html; Aero Plastic Industries; supra note 207, at 6.  
 209.  Aero Plastic Indus., supra note 207, at 6. 
 210.  Id. 
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materials.211  It was also observed that the ban would adversely im-
pact the plastic manufacturing business, employment and the wider 
economy.212  During this meeting, it was resolved that the Department 
would begin working on developing regulations to govern the impor-
tation, manufacturing, trade and distribution of plastics.213  It was also 
decided that implementation of the ban would be delayed until June 
30, 2014.214  Through a newspaper notice, the Secretary informed the 
general public that from the  June 30, 2014, it would be illegal to 
produce and/or use thin plastics.215  The notice indicated that non-
compliance with the ban would be an offense punishable by law.216  
However, it made no reference to a specific provision of the law that 
authorized the Secretary to ban thin plastics.217  In response, the plas-
tic manufacturers appealed to the Minister to extend further the ban 
to June 30, 2015.218  The Minister extended the ban, clearly stating 
that it would be the last extension.219  Curiously, neither the letter 
from the plastic manufacturers nor the response from the Minister 
was copied to the Director of Environmental Affairs.220  It is not clear 
what the legal basis for the appeal was or what law authorized the 
Minister to extend the deadline of the ban.  It was also alleged that 
the manufacturers appealed to the Head of State.221  Unsurprisingly, 
the Secretary for Environmental Affairs ignored the Ministerial ex-
tension and issued another advert that the ban was still effective and 
enforcement action would commence on June 30, 2014.222  In a sub-
sequent judicial review hearing, the Department of Environmental 
Affairs claimed that it “started enforcing the ban as it was not aware 
of the ministerial extension.”223 
 
 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id.  
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id.  
 215.  Robert Ngwira, No Manufacturing, Importation and Use of Thin Plastic Bags –
Government, FACE OF MALAWI (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2014/08/no-
manufacturing-importation-and-use-of-thin-plastic-bags-govt/.  
 216.  Mercy Malikwa, Government Bans Thin Plastics, THE NATION (Aug. 4, 2014), 
https://mwnation.com/government-bans-thin-plastics/. 
 217.  Aero Plastic Indus., supra note 207, at 7. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  See id. 
 220.  Id.  
 221.  This information was revealed by some government officials who were interviewed 
during the research. 
 222.  See Aero Plastic Indus., supra note 207, at 7. 
 223.  Id. 
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       In response, the plastic manufacturers commenced legal proceed-
ings to challenge the Secretary’s action on the basis that it was unrea-
sonable, ultra-vires, illegal, and violated the principles of natu- 
ral justice as well as the right to reasons.224  The matter was settled 
out of court.225  The settlement sought to take into account the eco-
nomic concerns of the plastic manufacturers.226 
The above case raised questions of legality, specifically the “in-
formal appeals” to the Minister and the Head of State by plastic man-
ufacturers.  The fact that the communications between the Minister 
and the plastic manufacturers were not copied to the Director for En-
vironmental Affairs raises serious questions of usurpation of powers 
of technocrats by the Minister.  Second, the public officials involved 
in this case were not able to point at the exact law that authorized 
them to act in the manner they purportedly acted.227  In fact, the re-
spondent’s affidavit merely stated that the ban was “an implementa-
tion of a policy issue that affects a wider group than the Applicants 
and had been a subject of sustained consultations between Govern-
ment and all stakeholders prior to” its implementation.228  The affida-
vit, however, did not respond to the question whether the EMA au-
thorized the Secretary of Environmental Affairs to impose a ban on 
thin plastics.229  Interestingly, the Applicant’s affidavit also failed to 
raise this issue as an aspect of illegality and concentrated on whether 
the Secretary’s action to reverse the extension for the commencement 
date of the ban was legal.230  This was problematic considering that 
both the Minister and Secretary for the Environment did not seem to 
have any legal basis for the powers they used in this case.  
In order to cure the above defects and to address the gap in the 
existing law, the Minister responsible for environmental affairs 
promulgated the Environment Management (Plastics) Regulations, 
2015.231  Regulations 3 of the Plastics Regulations prohibits “the im- 
 
 224.  State v. Secretary for Env’t & Climate Change Management, ex parte Vijay Kumar 
on Behalf of the Members of the Plastic Manufacturers Association of Malawi [2014] Judi-
cial Review Cause No. 54 (High Court of Malawi) (Application for Leave for Judicial Re-
view and the Supporting Affidavit). 
 225.  Interview with the applicant’s lawyer. 
 226.  Interview with the applicant’s lawyer. 
 227. Secretary for Env’t & Climate Change Management, ex parte Vijay Kumar on Be-
half of the Members of the Plastic Manufacturers Association of Malawi [2014] Judicial Re-
view Cause No. 54 (High Court of Malawi) (Brief for Respondent). 
 228.  Id.  
 229.  Id.  
 230.  Id. at Affidavit for Respondent. 
 231.  Government notice number 4, 2015; see also Aero Plastic Indus., supra note 207, at  
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portation, manufacturing, trade and commercial distribution of plas-
tics, plastic bags and plastic sheets made of plastic film with a wall of 
thickness of less than 60 micrometres . . . for use within Malawi.”232 
Another classic demonstration of illegality and irrationality is 
the case of The State v. Parliament (Parliamentary Committee on 
Natural Resources, Environment and Climate Change) and Others, 
ex-parte Stephen Phiri.233  In this case, the applicant “acquired hard-
wood which he wanted to export to China.”234  The applicant was 
granted a license by the Department of Forestry to export hard-
wood.235  After “clear[ing] export duty for the consignment,” the ap-
plicant “embarked on the process of exportation of the wood to Chi-
na.”236  However, due to the Parliamentary Committee on Natural 
Resources, Environment and Climate Change’s “verbal suspension 
on all hardwood exportation licences,” the consignment was held at 
the Mozambique border.237  After this, the applicant “requested the 
Director of Forestry to waive the suspension in his favour because the 
exportation process had already started and hence the ban could not 
be enforced retrospectively.”238  Once the applicant made the request, 
the “Director sought approval for the waiver of the ban from the 
Principal Secretary [PS], which was duly granted.”239  Even after the 
waiver was granted, “MRA and Forestry officers at the Border re-
fused to comply with the directive of the PS.”240  This led the appli-
cant to “commence[] judicial review proceedings against the above 
defendants.”241  During the proceedings, the “Court quashed the ban 
on the basis that the Parliamentary Committee had no power to make 
such an order.”242  In addition, the “Judge [] ruled that the decisions of 
the Forestry and MRA officers were unreasonable.”243  Overall, “this 
case obviously involved multiple breaches of Section 43 of the Con-
stitution.”244 
 
               7. 
 232.  Regulation 3 (Malawi). 
 233.  Judicial Review Cause No. 20 of 2015. 
 234.  BANDA, supra note 92, at 43.  
 235.  Id.  
 236.  Id.  
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        Another worrisome trend that this study found was that some-
times courts condoned illegal conduct by environmental agencies by 
what can be termed as “necessary illegality.”245  This has the potential 
to undermine the entrenchment of a culture of legality.  The case of 
Diab Properties Limited and Lilongwe City Council v. Rui Francisco, 
illustrates this point.246  This case involved an application “for an in-
junction against Lilongwe City Council to order Diab [P]roperties to 
stop constructing a shopping complex pending judicial review pro-
ceedings.”247  The application claimed “that Diab Properties had not 
conducted an environmental impact assessment before the com-
mencement of the project.”248  The injunction was set aside “on the 
basis that failure to conduct an EIA was not so fatal to warrant the 
demolition of the complex.”249  It was taken into account by the Court 
that “Diab Properties had invested 20 Million Kwacha in the project 
and that it would be imprudent to throw that money down the 
drain.”250  The Court observed: “a reasonable state institution would 
first weigh the overall investment benefit to the nation before con-
demning DPL.”251  The Court “concluded that the social and econom-
ic benefits of the project far outweighed the inconvenience that Rui 
Francisco would suffer.”252  
Based on the facts discussed above, it is obvious that the judge 
misdirected himself as to the issues raised by this question. Conse-
quently, he failed to vindicate the rule of law.  The EIA requirement 
is not a requirement of convenience.  It is a legal requirement aimed 
at preventing serious environmental degradation. Section 26(3) of the 
EMA prohibits licensing authorities from issuing licences to develop-
ers whose projects have not satisfied the EIA requirements.  The 
Judge therefore condoned illegal activity by setting aside an injunc-
tion in favor of a developer who had clearly broken the law.  
Another case which evidences “judicial condonation” of illegali-
ty was the case of Lilongwe Water Board, Minister of Agriculture Ir-
rigation and Water Development, Director of Environmental Affairs, 
Minister of Natural Resources Energy and Mining and Khato Civils 
 
 245.  This term was coined during the study.  
 246.  HC, Misc. Civil Cause No. 10 of 2003.  
 247.  BANDA, supra note 92, at 44.  
 248.  Id.  
 249.  Id.  
 250.  Id.  
 251.  Id.  
 252.  Id.; see also Kapindu & Kalima, supra note 142, at 22.  
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Proprietary Limited v. The State, ex parte Malawi Law Society.253  
This case arose in the context of the Salima-Lilongwe/Lake Malawi 
Water Project.254  The Malawi Law Society sought leave to com-
mence judicial review proceedings against the Lilongwe Water 
Board, the developer of the Salima-Lilongwe/Lake Malawi Water 
Supply Project, on grounds of failure to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) as required by law before abstracting water 
from Lake Malawi.255  Lilongwe Water Board engaged a contractor, 
Khato Civils Proprietary Limited, to implement the project.256  Ac-
cordingly, the Society sought a declaration that the Project should be 
stopped pending the conduction of an EIA and the receiving the nec-
essary approvals.257  The Society also challenged the failure of the 
Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development as the 
lead Minister to stop the implementation of the project until EIA re-
quirements were complied with.258  The Director of Environmental 
Affairs was also added as a party for failure to take measures to en-
sure compliance with EIA requirements, including stopping the im-
plementation of the project.259  The High Court granted leave for the 
Society to commence legal proceedings on the basis that the infor-
mation that the Applicant had gathered raised issues that were fit for 
determination upon a full judicial review hearing.260  Khato Civils 
subsequently sought the leave of the Supreme Court to Appeal 
against the grant of leave for judicial review.261 
Upon appeal, Justice Chikopa observed that in responding to the 
question whether or not there was a dispute between the Parties, it 
was important to understand the nature of the contract entered into  
between Lilongwe Water Board and Khato Civils.262  According to 
the Justice of Appeals, the Law Society narrowly understood the con-
tract as that of “abstracting water from Lake Malawi in Salima, puri-
fication of the water and pumping it over a distance of 120kms to Li-
 
 253. MSCA Civil Appeal No. 59 of (2017) (Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal) [hereinaf-
ter Lilongwe Water Board].  
 254.  Id. at 9. 
 255.  Id.  
 256.  Id.  
 257.  Id.  
 258.  State v. Lilongwe Water Bd. & Others, ex parte Malawi Law Soc’y [2017] MWHC 
135, Judicial Review Cause No. 16 of (2017), 3 (High Court of Malawi). 
 259.  Id. at 4. 
 260.  Id. at 1, 5. 
 261.  Lilongwe Water Board, supra note 253.   
 262.  Id. at 9. 
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longwe.”263  The Justice of Appeal noted that the contract was broader 
than envisaged by the Society.264  Rather it was an “Engineering, Pro-
curement and Construction contract.”265  According to the Judge: 
Even on a cursory perusal of the Contract it is obvious 
that an EIA was not necessary for the first two com-
ponents of the contract. There would be nowhere to do 
it seeing as the pipeline route would not be known un-
til, at the very least, after completion of the engineer-
ing component. It is on the other hand a fact that an 
EIA would be necessary before the construction com-
ponent of the contract commenced. If something had 
to be stopped before an EIA was conducted it is in our 
judgment the construction component. If the Society 
wanted an interlocutory injunction to ensure that an 
EIA was conducted it should have asked for and been 
granted a targeted injunction. One that only stopped 
the construction works which admittedly required an 
EIA before they could commence and not the engi-
neering and procurement components that did not re-
quire an EIA to commence.266 
The Judge then concluded that there was no dispute in this case 
given that Khato Civils and other respondents had agreed that “an 
EIA would be undertaken before construction works commenced” 
and that a process was already in place for the identification of an 
EIA consultant.267  
        Curiously, Justice Chikopa refused to consider the fact that Kha-
to Civils had brought construction equipment into Malawi prior to 
this incident as indicative of the fact that it was not intending to com-
ply with EIA requirements.268  He made the following observation:  
The Society referred to the Interested Party bringing 
into Malawi equipment particularly the trenchers and 
spoke of it as evidence that the first Respondent and 
the Interested Party had already started implementing 
the Contract without doing an EIA. The Society was 
 
 263.  Id.  
 264.  Id.  
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. at 9–10.  
 267.  Id. at 10.  
 268.  Id. at 11. 
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perhaps reading too much into the above. To begin 
with a proper reading of the Contract and the briefing 
Notes shows that the Interested Party had to prove ca-
pacity including possession of requisite equipment. 
Possession out of Malawi would not make too much 
sense. There should therefore be nothing wrong with 
the Interested Party bringing trenchers into Malawi. It 
is not evidence that they have started trenching. Or 
will soon start. Only perhaps that they would be ready 
to do so when necessary. And we do not think that 
they should be punished for flaunting their capacity to 
execute the contract. In fact they ought to be lauded.269  
In these circumstances it would be difficult to come to a conclu-
sion other than that Justice Chikopa was at pains to justify and even 
lauding the possible illegality within this case.270  This is especially 
clear because the Justice of Appeal’s statement contradicted an earli-
er statement by the Attorney General who expressed surprise as to 
why an EIA was not made a condition precedent of the contract.271   
This, according to Justice Kapindu, was indicative of the fact that an 
EIA is supposed to precede the implementation of the contract.272  He 
noted:  
What emerges here is that the Attorney General was 
asking the 1st Respondent why the design of the pro-
ject was not such that the contract should only take ef-
fect once an environmental impact assessment Report 
had been issued. Put differently, the Attorney General 
was advising that according to his understanding of 
the law, an environmental impact assessment should 
be made to precede the commencement of the contract 
 
 269.  Id. 
 270. See id.  
 271.  State v. Lilongwe Water Bd. & Others, ex parte Malawi Law Soc’y [2017] MWHC 
135, Judicial Review Cause No. 16 of (2017), 39 (High Court of Malawi). 
Justice Kapindu observed that in a Memo to Lilongwe Water Board the Attorney General 
queried as follows: “Please address me on why an Environmental Impact Assessment Report 
has not been made a condition precedent to the validity of the contract. My concern here 
arises because…such a project shall not be implemented unless an environmental impact as-
sessment is carried out.;” see also Malawi Lawyers Halt Multi-Million Samila-Lilongwe Wa-
ter Project, Judicial Review Pending, MARAVI POST (Sept. 16, 2017), http://www.maravipo 
st.com/malawi-lawyers-halt-multi-million-salima-lilongwe-water-project-judicial-review-pe 
nding/.  
 272.  Lilongwe Water Bd. & Others, ex parte Malawi Law Soc’y [2017] MWHC 135, 
Judicial Review Cause No. 16 of (2017). 
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because the project, in law, can only be commenced 
once a satisfactory environmental impact assessment 
Report is issued.273  
         In his reasoning, Justice Kapindu highlighted a number of is-
sues that were in support of the Society’s case.274  This included that 
in response to the Attorney General’s query, the Lilongwe Water 
Board amended “the Conditions Precedent (CPs) to include recruit-
ment of an ESIA consultant before project effectiveness.”275  And 
rightly so the Judge concluded that: 
[T]he overarching question as to what constitutes pro-
ject implementation and whether the current activities 
which are part of the Interested Party’s contractual 
performance are part of implementation, is a question 
fit for consideration on a full hearing of judicial re-
view. For purposes of the principles on the granting of 
interlocutory injunctions, it presents a serious question 
to be tried.276 
On the contrary, Justice Chikopa went beyond what is required 
at the leave stage and delved into questions that could best be deter-
mined at a full judicial review hearing.277 
        This study also unearthed perceptions that courts and environ-
mental agencies are sometimes reluctant to stop illegal conduct where 
doing so would inconvenience powerful actors within the system.278  
The case of Ismail Khan and Kamulepo Kalua v. African Parks Net-
work Limited and others279 was often cited as an example.  The case 
involved community members and interest groups who had obtained 
an injunction against the translocation of elephants from Phirilongwe 
in Mangochi District to Majete Wildlife Reserve by African Parks.280  
The translocation exercise had received endorsement from the gov-
ernment and some traditional leaders.281  However, the applicants op-
posed the translocation on grounds that it was conducted without 
consulting the local community and without any Environmental and 
 
 273.  Id.  
 274.  Id. at 38–39.  
 275.  Id. at 39. 
 276.  Id. at 38.  
 277.  Lilongwe Water Board, supra note 253, at 10-11. 
 278.  Disclosed during interviews with the respondents. 
 279.  High Court Civil Case No. 1185 of 2009 (Unreported).   
 280.  Id. at 1-2. 
 281.  Id. at 8. 
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Wildlife Impact Assessment.282  The applicants also argued that every 
Malawian had the right to “enjoy the environment, life and economic 
activity” and that the translocation of elephants would seriously jeop-
ardize this if the elephants were translocated.283  The Court vacated 
the injunction.284  In the process, the Court considered whether the 
translocation process complied with Wildlife Impact Assessment and 
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements stipulated in the Na-
tional Parks and Wildlife Act and the Environment Management Act 
respectively.285  The Court held that Section 23 of the National Parks  
and Wildlife Act clearly stipulated that “it is ‘any person’ not neces-
sarily the State who may request that such impact assessment be con-
ducted.”286 
Accordingly, the Court held that in this case the applicants could 
not complain because there was nothing in their affidavits to suggest 
that “such an assessment was requested or that indeed if it was, the 
same was refused.”287  The Court also dismissed the contention that 
an environmental impact assessment was supposed to be conducted 
before translocating the elephants.288  It observed that Section 24 of 
the Environment Management Act required an EIA if the responsible 
Minister specified in the Gazette the types and sizes of projects which 
could not be implemented in the absence of an EIA.289  The Judge ob-
served that he could not enforce EIA provisions on this project be 
cause there was nothing in the affidavits to show that the area in 
question was specified and gazetted as an area “for which an impact 
assessment has to be done before any project is carried out.”290   
It should be noted that the Judge’s reasoning in the above case 
was rather faulty.  Section 24 gives discretion to the Minister to spec-
ify the types and sizes of projects which should not be implemented 
without an EIA.291  However, it does not require the Minister to speci-
 
 282.  Id. at 3. 
 283.  Id. at 5-6. 
 284.  Id. at 20-21. 
 285.  Id. at 14. 
 286.  Id. at 14. Section 23 provides that “any person who has a good and sufficient reason 
to believe that any proposed or existing government process or activity of the government or 
any other organization or person may have an adverse effect on any wildlife species or 
community such person may request, through the Board, the Minister that an environmental 
impact assessment be conducted.” Id. § 23. 
 287.  Id. at 14.  
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Id.; see also Chirwa, supra note 112.   
 291.  EMA 1996, supra note 144, § 24(1).  
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fy and gazette areas for which EIAs should be conducted.292  In any 
case, the translocation of elephants from Phirilongwe clearly fell 
within the provisions of the Environment (Specification of Projects 
Requiring Environmental Impact Assessment) Notice.293  The notice, 
among others, provides that an EIA is required for “projects in prox-
imity to, or which have the potential to affect … national parks, game 
reserves and protected areas.”294  What is particularly interesting in 
this case is that the Judge found that an EIA was unnecessary even 
though Phirilongwe is a forest reserve in close proximity to Lake Ma-
lawi National Park and Nankumba Peninsula.295  Unsurprisingly, 
some respondents felt that the Judge could not enforce the law in this 
case because of powerful corporate and political interests associated 
with the translocation of elephants.296 
This study has further found that courts have a tendency to con-
done illegality on the basis of necessity.297  For instance, between 
2004 and 2014 the Government of Malawi did not hold local gov-
ernment elections.298  This had implications for the legality of rules 
that local authorities made during this period.299  The absence of 
Councillors meant that there were no vibrant Councils and environ-
mental rulemaking entities at local authority level.300  This forced 
Courts to develop the principle of ‘necessary legality’ in order to ad-
dress the absurdities and adverse consequences of this legal vacu-
um.301  The case of Zomba Municipal Assembly v. the University of 
Malawi,302 illustrates how the High Court was more than keen to con-
done illegal rule-making of the Municipality of Zomba in order to en-
 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Environment (Specification of Projects Requiring Environmental Impact Assess-
ment) Notice, G.N. 58 (1998). 
 294.  Id. § 13.  
 295.  High Court Civil Case No. 1185 of 2009, supra note 279, at 3; see also Phirilongwe 
Forest Reserve, GEOVIEW, http://mw.geoview.info/phirilongwe_forest_reserve,924178 (last 
visited May 4, 2019). 
 296.  Martin Chipofya, Right Drowning in a Market, the Court Cannot Rescue it: What is 
the Solution?, U. MALAWI, 10-13 (2018) https://www.academia.edu/32087546/red5_RI 
GHT_DROWNING_IN_A_MARKET_THE_COURT_CANNOT_RESCUE_IT_WHAT_IS
_THE_SOLUTION?auto=download.  
 297.  See Banda, supra note 213, at 35; see also KANYONGOLO, supra note 104, at 13.   
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Michael Chasukwa et al., Public Participation in Local Councils in Malawi in the 
Absence of Local Elected Representatives-Political Eliticism or Pluralism, 49 J. OF ASIAN & 
AFR. STUD. 705, 705–20 (2014).   
 300.  Banda, supra note 92, at 35. 
 301.  KANYONGOLO, supra note 104, at 13; GH Bandawe (trading as Kaka Motel) v. 
Mzuzu City Assembly High Court Civil Cause No. 63 of 2006. 
 302.  [2000] Civil Cause No. 3567 (Malawi High Court). 
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sure that the Municipality of Zomba collected rates to support service 
delivery.303  The Court was requested to determine whether Zomba 
Municipal Assembly had the legal mandate to revise rates in the ab-
sence of elected Councillors.304  The Court conceded that, legally, the 
power to the Local Government Act (LGA) conferred the power to 
levy taxes on Assemblies and that this power was not delegable.305  
However, the Court noted that the law was silent on what is supposed 
to happen in the absence of the Assembly.306 
Accordingly, the Court proceeded to decide, based on the need 
to avoid creating an absurdity and to fulfil the Constitutional obliga-
tions of the Assembly, that Zomba Municipal Assembly was legally 
entitled to levy taxes.307  It noted that Local Assemblies had a consti-
tutional and statutory duty to provide essential services to their resi-
dents.308  This duty, according to the Court, subsisted irrespective of 
whether there was an assembly or not.309  Consequently, “any inter-
pretation of the LGA that would result in the invalidating of constitu-
tional duty imposed on the assembly to levy taxes was invalid and 
must be avoided.”310  However, the notion of “necessary legality” was 
rejected by Justice Chikopa in GH Bandawe (trading as Kaka Motel) 
v. Mzuzu City Assembly.311  In this case, the Judge stressed the needs 
for Assemblies to be run in accordance with the law and for Courts to 
avoid sanctioning illegality under the pretext of “avoiding absurdi-
ties.”312  Accordingly, the Judge correctly held that in the absence of 
Councillors, an Assembly cannot be deemed to be lawfully constitut-
ed.313  Consequently, it cannot legally levy and collect rates.314  In re-
jecting the notion of necessity the Judge observed:  
 The doctrine of necessity also has no application here-
in. As we understood the defendants it is necessary 
that Assemblies be deemed to still be in existence the 
absence of councillors notwithstanding because to 
 
 303.  Id. at 7-8. 
 304.  Id. at 4. 
 305.  Id. at 8. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id.  
 311.  HC Civil Cause No. 63 of 2006.  
 312.  Id. at 34. 
 313.  Id. at 35. 
 314.  Id.  
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proceed otherwise would bring local governance to a 
standstill. That local government might come to a 
standstill might be true. We have no doubt however 
that those who deemed it fit to dissolve Assemblies 
and hold no local government elections were well 
aware of the consequences of their actions.  We have 
above narrated some of them. . . . The way to deal 
with such consequences however is not to call upon 
the doctrine of necessity. It is to call for fresh local 
government elections so that new Assemblies can 
come about.315  
B. Procedural Propriety/Impropriety 
The principle of procedural propriety requires that environmen-
tal agencies must comply with procedural rules that are  stipulated in 
the Constitution, enabling statutes and regulations when applying 
rules.316  Where applicable, agencies must also comply with common 
law rules of natural justice and procedural fairness.317 
         Failure to do so exposes public officers to challenges of proce-
dural impropriety.318  Courts in Malawi have consistently upheld the 
orthodox common law principle to the effect that judicial review is 
not concerned with the merits of particular decisions.319  Rather, it is 
concerned with procedural fairness, except for exceptional circum- 
stances.320  The jurisdiction of courts in matters of judicial review is 
restricted to scrutinizing the decision-making process in order to de-
termine whether the complainant was treated fairly.321   
 
 315.  Id. at 40. 
 316.  See GCHQ, supra note 202, at 411. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  JZU Tembo and Another v. Speaker of the National Assembly, MSCA Civil Appeal 
No. 1 of 2003; Masangano v. Attorney General and Others, Constitutional Case No. 15 of 
2007 at 9; The State v. Council of the University of Malawi, Ex-parte University of Malawi 
Workers Trade Union, High Court Misc. Civil Cause No. 1 of 2015 at 13. 
 320.  In State v. Council of the University of Malawi, ex parte University of Malawi 
Workers Trade Union, [2015] Civil Cause No. 1, 14 (High Court of Malawi), Justice Kapin-
du observed that “in some cases of judicial review of administrative action courts may also 
delve, in some cases, into the substance or merits of the decision, an instance is where the 
claim is grounded in unreasonableness. It makes sense, in such a case, for the Court to ap-
propriately delve into the merits of the decision. However, the court still does so with re-
straint and only as far as is necessary.” Id. at 14.  
 321.  See State v. Council of the Univ. of Malawi, ex parte Univ. of Malawi Workers 
Trade Union, [2015] Civil Cause No. 1, 14 (High Court of Malawi); Mpinganjira & Others 
v. Council of the Univ. of Malawi, [1994] Civil Cause No. 4 (High Court of Malawi); Upile 
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        The case of The State and the Director of Environmental Affairs 
exparte Aero Plastic Industries Ltd and Abdul Majid Sattar T/A 
Rainbow Plastics and 12 Others illustrates the above point.322 Subse-
quent to the adoption of the Plastics Regulations the Director of Envi-
ronmental Affairs shut down some factories and imposed fines on 
them on grounds that they were contravening Regulation 3.323  The 
decision was challenged by some plastics manufacturers who ad-
vanced two grounds for challenging the actions of the Director: first, 
the manufacturers argued that the Director acted without giving them 
the right to be heard; second, it was argued that the Director did not 
take into consideration factors including “the hardship the decision 
would cause to the applicants, their distributors and consumers.”324  
The applicants also contended that the Director disregarded similar 
regulations on “minimum microns within the Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC) region and beyond.”325  The court 
held that the applicants were given sufficient opportunity to be 
heard.326  According to Justice Potani, the Director inspected the 
premises of the applicants prior to the closures and issued warning 
letters to the applicants.327  He observed as follows:  
The position of the law is therefore very clear and set-
tled that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review 
is not to question the merits of the decision(s) com-
plained of but to scrutinise the decision making pro-
cess if it accorded the complainant a fair treatment. As 
it is said at times, judicial review is concerned with 
procedural fairness.  
….. 
Certainly, the respondent having earlier warned the 
applicants who did not make representations but con-
tinued with the mischief, the respondent cannot be ac-
cused of not having heard the applicants before clos-
ing the factories. The respondent made every effort to  
treat the applicants fairly.328 
 
Chioza suing by Andrew Chioza v. Bd. of Governors of Marymount Secondary Sch. [1996] 
Civil Cause No. 254 of 1996 (High Court of Malawi). 
 322.  [2016] Judicial Review Cause No. 20 (High Court of Malawi). 
 323.  Id.  at 3. 
 324.  Aero Plastic Industries, supra note 207, at 2.  
 325.  Id.   
 326.  Id. at 5. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Id. at 4–6.  
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        Procedural fairness is required in rule-making, rule-application 
and rule adjudication processes.329  In The State v. The Director of 
Environmental Affairs, ex parte Aero Plastic Industries Ltd and Ab-
dul Majid Sattar T/A Rainbow Plastics and 12 Others, Justice Potani 
considered whether the process of making the Environment Man-
agement (Plastics) Regulations, 2015 was fair.330  He observed as fol-
lows: 
From the evidence, as it has just been shown, the re-
spondent conducted extensive consultations with all 
relevant stakeholders including the applicants and only 
came up with the regulations on the ban and imple-
mentation after taking into account the feedback and 
relevant factors including economic implications of 
the ban.  In the end result, the applicants’ complaint 
that the respondent did not pay due regard to relevant  
factors/considerations such as the hardship the deci-
sion would cause to the applicants, their distributors 
and consumers, is baseless and unsustainable.331 
        However, failure to pay attention to the meaning of rules was 
evident from this study.332  It is not uncommon for agencies to adopt 
rule-application processes that are not in compliance with procedures 
required by statutes and regulations.333 The EIA approval process is a 
case in point. Section 26 of the EMA 1996 gives the Director the re-
sponsibility of recommending EIA approvals to the Minister.334  
However, this study established that in practice EIA reports are re-
viewed by the TCE, which sends its recommendations to the NCE.335  
The reports are then referred to the Minister after approval by NCE.336  
This procedure raises questions of legality.337  According to EIA 
Guidelines, TCE members are entitled to participate in the EIA pro-
cess and “recommend courses of action to the Director.”338  However, 
 
 329. KANYONGOLO, supra note 104, at 9, 18–19;  see also Genevieve Carter, Procedural 
Fairness in Legislative Functions: The End of Judicial Abstince, 13 U. OF TORONTO J. 217-
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 330.  High Court Judicial Cause No. 20 of 2016 at 7-8. 
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 334.  EMA 1996, supra note 144, § 26(1)(d). 
 335.  Banda, supra note 92, at 46. 
 336.  Id. 
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 338. Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines, MALAWI SDNP ¶ 2.3.2.4., 
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according to the Guidelines, the Director has discretion whether to 
follow the advice of the TCE or not, “he is not bound by it.”339  The 
statutory responsibilities to regulate the EIA process are conferred on 
the Director and the Minister.340  The TCE is only supposed to per-
form technical and advisory roles.341  Failure to pay careful attention 
to the meaning of the Act and the Guidelines leads to the above ille-
gality.  
Serious procedural improprieties were also evident in this 
study.342  In The State v. Lilongwe Town Planning Committee and 
Others ex parte Mirza,343 the government designated a certain area in 
Lilongwe as new City Centre and indicated that land would be avail-
able for lease. The applicant applied for a lease of part of the land and 
the City Council allocated the land to him.344  The applicant incurred 
costs of K18 million during the development of the land and 
US48000 on consultants.345  When the applicant submitted an applica-
tion for development permission, the City Council deferred consider-
ation of the application under the pretext that it was supposed to ap-
prove the layout plan prior to granting development permission.346   In 
the interim, the applicant was still required to pay ground rentals.347  
Subsequently, after persistent reminders, the applicant was allocated 
a smaller plot in a different location.348  The applicant commenced 
proceedings against the City Council.349  It was held that the function 
of the Court was to ensure that lawful authority is not abused by un-
fair treatment.350  The Judge observed that any reasonable person di-
recting his mind to this case would conclude that failure by the re-
spondents to lift a notice of deferment for over sixty months 
amounted to procedural impropriety towards the applicant meriting 
reversal of the decision of the City Council.351  Similarly, the Judge 
ruled that the decision to defer making a decision for five years was 
 
http://www.sdnp.org.mw/enviro/eia/chap2.html#2.2 (last visited May 5, 2019).  
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 340.  EMA 1996, supra note 144, §§ 24–26. 
 341.  Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines, supra note 338.  
 342.  Banda, supra note 92, at 47. 
 343.  Lilongwe Water Board, supra note 271. 
 344.  Banda, supra note 92, at 47. 
 345.  Id.  
 346.  Id.  
 347.  Id.  
 348.  Id.  
 349.  Id.  
 350.  Id.  
 351.  Id.  
BANDA  
2019] AD. JUSTICE, ENV. GOVERNANCE & RULE OF LAW IN MALAWI 63 
unreasonable and in bad faith.352  Justice Chombo held that the first 
respondent had the right to defer making a decision in accordance 
with Section 37(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act.353  How-
ever, the impropriety was characterized by “failure to inform the ap-
plicant of the progress of the application and the likely date on which 
the decision will be taken.”354  The Judge also classified other forms 
of conduct on the part of the defendants as procedural impropriety,  
including failure to consult or notify the Applicant before allocating a 
new plot to him, as well as collecting land rentals from him prior to 
making a decision.355 
Another case that raises triable issues relating to procedural pro-
priety is Diab Dairy Farming Ltd vs Lilongwe Water Board and At-
torney General.356  In 2005, the plaintiff purchased land for purposes 
of dairy farming from District Commissioner Lilongwe.  In order to 
get authorization for the establishment of the farm, the plaintiff en-
gaged consultants to conduct an EIA.  The Minister of Environmental 
Affairs issued an EIA certificate in favor of the dairy farm project in 
2006.  The Water Resources Board subsequently gave him water 
rights from the Likuni River with the approval of Lilongwe Water 
Board.  Subsequently, the Water Board objected to the development 
on grounds that the proposed development was too close to the intake 
point of Lilongwe Water Board and that there was a high potential for 
water pollution from animal waste and an increase in nitrates.  The 
Board also cited “non-compliance with EIA requirements as evi-
denced by sinking borehole and requests to abstract water from Li-
longwe River” as grounds for the objection.  In response, the Plaintiff 
commenced proceedings against the Defendants for interfering with 
its business.  In its defense, the EAD has pleaded that it only issues 
an EIA certificate upon consultation of all stakeholders and on condi-
tion that no stakeholder raises objections.  The EAD states that it no 
longer supports the project because Lilongwe Water Board, a key 
stakeholder, raised an objection and changed its stance on the project.  
This Commercial Court held that the case was improperly before the 
Court and referred it to the Town and Country Planning Board. Jus-
tice Manda observed as follows: “I find it curious that the Depart-
ment of Environmental Affairs did issue an Environmental Impact 
Assessment Certificate for this project. Thus the question would be; 
 
 352.  Id.  
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under what grounds did the Town and Country Planning Committee 
reject the development permission in view of the Environmental Im-
pact Assessment?”357  In other words, this case raises issues of proce-
dural propriety including whether Section 43 of the Constitution was 
followed before revocation of planning permission.  
V.  IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  
Commentators have noted that the impact of judicial review 
cannot be isolated from its functions, purposes and objectives.”358  
This is because “the impact of judicial review can be effectively re-
searched only in the light of the assumed or asserted purposes and 
functions of judicial review.”359  In this regard, court decisions are an 
important source of primary data on the purpose of judicial review.360 
This is because when determining judicial review matters, judges of-
fer great insights on what they consider to be the role and impact of 
judicial review.   
Malawian Courts have repeatedly observed that the purpose of 
judicial review is to ensure the fair treatment of applicants and that 
lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment.361  Beyond indi-
vidual applicants, courts have held that judicial review aims to ensure 
transparency in decision making and that relevant authorities use 
their powers in a proper manner.362  Judicial review also aims to con-
trol executive action in order to ensure that public officers act legally, 
rationally and follow proper procedures.363  There is thus a general 
belief that judicial review of agency rule-making, application and ad-
judication aims to stimulate good governance.  This is by ensuring 
that agencies comply with the principles of legality, rationality and 
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procedural propriety.364  Courts have even gone as far as claiming that 
judicial review “is the most effective means by which courts control 
administrative actions by public functionaries.”365  However, as ob-
served above, claims of this nature have not been empirically tested 
within the context of Malawi.  Little is known about the value of ju-
dicial review in practice.  
Against this backdrop, this study set out to inquire whether judi-
cial review achieves what the judges and commentators claim to be 
its objectives and purposes.366  To investigate whether judicial review 
had any impact on the practical operations of environmental agencies 
we asked the respondents the following questions: whether the pro- 
spect of judicial review influenced public officer to adjust their be-
havior in order to align it with the principles of legality, rationality 
and procedural propriety. 
One challenge that was experienced in this study, however, was 
failure by some respondents to grasp the meaning of the term ‘judi-
cial review’ and to distinguish it from other forms of litigation 
against environmental agencies.367  However, the researchers mitigat-
ed this problem by clarifying the meaning of judicial review to the re-
spondents and guiding the respondents to focus on judicial review as 
opposed to other forms of litigation.  The following sections present 
finding that correspond to these questions.  
Generally, this study had mixed findings relating to the impact 
of judicial review.368  While some respondents felt that judicial review 
had generally had a positive impact on environmental governance, 
others thought its impact was negative, yet others were indifferent.369 
Respondents who viewed judicial review positively highlighted both 
the direct and indirect impacts of judicial review on the behavior of 
public officers.  These respondents generally observed that judicial 
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review not only influenced the behavior of public officials directly 
involved in particular disputes but also indirectly affected the behav-
ior of all other officials who were potentially subject to judicial re-
view.  Specifically, the evidence collected in this study suggests that 
judicial review generally has a positive impact on the behavior of in 
dividual public officers.  Public officers observed that they generally 
complied with court decisions, save for cases that have wider politi-
cal ramifications. 
With regard to direct impacts, public officers who had no direct 
experience of judicial review challenges noted that threats of legal 
challenges generally force them to act cautiously.370  Anticipation of 
possible challenges compels them to follow proper procedures before 
making decisions that may potentially be challenged.  The respond-
ents also noted that anticipation of judicial review compels them to 
engage a little more with potential challengers before implementing 
rules than otherwise.  Of course, some respondents looked at this 
from a negative perspective and observed that the fear of judicial 
challenges sometimes forced them to be more bureaucratic than they 
should be.  This in turn tended to delay decision making and imple-
mentation processes. 
One way of determining the impact of judicial review is to con-
sider whether judicial review decisions lead to reconsideration of de-
cisions by the original decision-makers.371  In this regard, this study 
found evidence of environmental agencies rethinking their decisions 
after judicial review challenges.372  For instance, the Department of 
Environmental Affairs promulgated the Environment Management 
(Plastics) Regulations, 2015, partly in response to a judicial review 
challenge by plastic manufacturers. 
There were many suggestions from interview responses that ju-
dicial review is considered to have had significant impacts beyond 
the parties to specific cases.373  In particular, the responses suggested 
that judicial review has triggered observable systemic changes in the 
way public agencies make decisions.  In this context, respondents 
who have served government for more than a decade were able to 
give concrete examples of systemic changes that have taken place in  
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government that could be attributable to judicial review.  These in-
clude changes in internal policies, procedures and administrative 
practices to avoid legal challenges. 
        The capacity building initiatives that government has been un-
dertaking in the field of administrative law are also attributable to the 
quickening of judicial review since 1992.374  For example, some re-
spondents noted that the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the 
President and Cabinet regularly organized administrative justice 
courses for senior government officials between 2000 and 2005.375  
The courses, which were facilitated by Judges, the office of the Solic-
itor General and academics, were described as very helpful.376  The 
organization of the courses, according to them, was indicative of the 
impact of judicial review and the recognized need on the part of gov-
ernment to build practical capacity in administrative law.  The devel-
opment of administrative law manuals for senior public officials was 
also cited as an indicator of the impact of judicial review.  The idea 
behind the above capacity building initiatives is essentially to address 
systemic failures in decision making that have been identified in suc-
cessive judicial review decisions.  Representatives of CSOs that we 
interviewed tended to consider judicial review as a way of bringing 
issues onto the national political agenda.  According to them, the 
publicity that accompanies judicial review ensures that issues at stake 
are discussed in the public domain.  This in turn influences the way 
public officials make their decisions. 
Notwithstanding the above, this study found that individual pub-
lic officers sometimes failed to adjust their behavior in compliance 
with court decisions because they were subject to diverse influences 
and pressures from several sources.377  This sometimes effectively 
eroded the impact of judicial review.  The findings of this study also 
reveal that, contrary to conventional wisdom, judicial review may 
have unintended negative side-effects on the behavior of some bu-
reaucrats.  For example, some technocrats have developed a negative 
attitude against judicial review and view is an interference with tech-
nocratic autonomy by Judges who do not understand environmental 
science.  Opponents of judicial review also decried the growing trend 
towards ‘judicialization’ of government, as evidenced by the ever-
growing increase in the number of challenges against public authori-
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ties.  They equated judicial review to inappropriate judicial activism 
and an undue interference with their technocratic autonomy by judges 
who had very little appreciation of the science which informs envi-
ronmental management.  Similarly, some public officials did not 
seem to appreciate the real value of judicial review and regarded ju-
dicial review decisions as “mere technicalities.”  
As a result, some bureaucrats merely adopted cosmetic practices 
and procedures in order to fulfill the technical requirements that 
would help them avoid judicial review challenges.378  Evidence of ex-
plicit risk taking by agencies was also gathered, especially in cases 
that had political implications.  Some respondents observed that in 
the event of a conflict between the views of their political superiors 
and the possible views of courts they were more inclined to follow 
the directives of their superiors and risk judicial review.  This study 
found only one case in which a public officer challenged the views of 
a Minister. 
However, it would be intellectually naive to regard judicial re-
view as the only factor that impacts rulemaking, rule application, and 
rule adjudication. It would also be misleading to think that it is “the 
only or perhaps the most important mechanism of legal accountabil-
ity.”379  The factors that determine the bureaucratic behavior are mul-
tiple and multifaceted. Sunkin terms these factors “an administrative 
soup of influences in decision-making.”380  A major challenge for re-
searchers who want to determine the impact of judicial review then 
becomes how to determine the relative significance of judicial review  
in influencing agency behavior.381  A study of the impact of judicial 
review would thus not be complete without considering other factors 
that influence decisions of public officers. 
In this context, this study found that political considerations af-
fect the rate and direction of rulemaking more than judicial consid-
erations.382  For example, in 2012, the EAD produced a cabinet paper 
to combat deforestation which proposed the promulgation of rules to  
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ban the use of burnt bricks because of their impact on deforestation.  
However, no progress has been made on this proposal because of in-
tense opposition from politicians.383   
Political patronage, pressure and interference were also cited 
among the major factors that undermine the ability of public officers 
to effectively apply environmental law.384  Most respondents noted 
that pressure from politicians was one of the major obstacles to com-
pliance with principles of administrative law.385  The areas that are 
most prone to political interference include the granting of approvals, 
licenses, permits and concessions.386  Similarly, respondents observed 
a worrisome trend whereby persons aggrieved by decisions of desig-
nated duty bearers lodged appeals with Ministers or even the office of 
the Presidency.387  This exposes such duty bearers to political pres-
sure.388  Informal influences were also evident in this study.389  Evi-
dence of political party functionaries influencing the way environ-
mental agencies make decisions was also unearthed by the study.  
This demonstrates that real power seldom lies with environmental 
agencies but rather with “invisible Barons” who influenced decision-
making behind the scenes.  Decentering was thus clearly evident in 
this study.  Other factors that were mentioned as adversely impacting 
the ability of agencies to comply with administrative law principles in 
their rule application functions included corruption and lack of ad-
ministrative law training/orientation.   
Chronic underfunding was cited as a major challenge that im-
paired the capacity of EAD to apply and enforce environmental 
law.390  For instance, it was noted that EIA Guidelines provide that 
compliance with EIA terms and conditions should be managed 
through “proper audits developed by the TCE and approved by the 
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Director.”391  However, environmental inspectors fail to monitor 
compliance with EIA conditions because of inadequate financial ca-
pacity and technical capacity.392  Accordingly, it is not uncommon for 
projects to reach completion without being monitored.393  Resource 
constraints at national and local levels thus undermined the ability of 
environmental agencies to perform their statutory duties.394 
VI. CONCLUSION  
This study set out to analyze the qualitative significance of ad-
ministrative justice on environmental governance and the rule of 
law.395  The study also examined the role and impact of judicial re-
view in environmental governance and to suggest possible reforms to 
the system of environmental governance in Malawi.  The following 
sections summarize the findings of this study: 
One of the defining characteristics of Malawi’s environmental 
law is that it is diffuse in nature.  There is no single legal instrument 
that governs all aspects of environmental management.  Neither is 
there a single institution responsible for environmental governance.  
As a result, the map of environmental agencies in Malawi is charac-
terized by a multiplicity of lead agencies that govern various sectors  
of the environment.  These agencies have jurisdictional overlaps and 
inconsistent mandates, which creates implications for environmental 
governance and the rule of law. 
One tool for promoting environmental accountability is judicial 
review of administrative action.  However, the effectiveness of judi-
cial review largely depends on the participation of a wide range of af-
fected interests in the adjudication process.  In order to participate ef-
fectively in environmental management, citizens need to be 
guaranteed the right of access to courts and tribunals to enable them 
to challenge environmental decisions.  This has so far been restricted 
because of stringent standing rules which have been reviewed by the 
recently enacted EMA, 2016.  This Act, however, is not yet in force. 
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The impacts of judicial review are complex and multifaceted.  
On the one hand judicial review has had the impact of making offi-
cials more aware that their decisions could be challenged and thus 
encouraging them to seek legal advice, to draft their decisions more 
carefully and to be more thorough in internally reviewing decisions.  
On the other hand, however, the threat of legal challenges tends to 
make administrators defensive and compels them to adopt procedures 
which would enable them to demonstrate to the courts (if they were 
challenged) that their decisions had been properly made. This con-
firms earlier studies that judicial review leads to more bureaucracy, a 
greater attention to detail, and a greater role for lawyers within gov-
ernment.  Worse still, some agencies viewed court decisions nega- 
tively and raised questions as to why their technocratic  
autonomy should be encroached upon by judges who had limited 
knowledge of environmental science and management. 
There are a number of factors that tend to undermine the devel-
opment of a culture of good governance and the rule of law in the en-
vironmental sector.  These factors include outdated and incoherent 
legislation, political patronage/ interference, capture of the rule appli-
cation process by the powerful, resource constraints, poverty and the 
difficulty of enforcing the law without providing alternatives to peo-
ple whose livelihoods are at stake.  
       To conclude, good environmental governance and the rule of law 
will only become a reality if deliberate efforts are taken to address the 
above factors. 
